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ARTICLES
PROPERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Mark Cordes*
The last decade has seen an increased recognition of property
rights in Supreme Court analysis. This is most evident in the
area of takings law, where the Court has on at least four occa-
sions expanded property rights relative to government regula-
tion.1 Perhaps even more significant than the results them-
selves has been the Court's tone in these decisions, where it
has emphasized that property rights are to be taken seriously'
and are not a "poor relation" to other constitutional safe-
guards.3 This has led some commentators to suggest that recog-
nition of property rights is becoming a primary agenda item of
the Court.4
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University
College of Law;, B.S., Portland State University; J.D., Willamette University, J.S.M.,
Stanford University.
1. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (remarking that
the Fifth Amendments Property Clause is "more than a pleading requirement and
compliance with it [is] more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination.").
3. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
4. See, e.g., Otto J. Hetzel & Kimberly A. Gough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan
v. City of Tigard on Local Government's Land Use Powers, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVEL-
OPmENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 219 (David
Callies ed., 1996); Michael C. Blumm, The End of Environmental Law? Libertarian
Property, Natural Law, and the Just Compensation Clause in the Federal Circuit, 25
ENvTL. L. 171, 171 (1995); Patrick Parenteau, Who's Taking What? Property Rights,
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A more subtle form of emerging property rights is seen in
their interplay with First Amendment rights.5 This theme was
first explored in a provocative 1982 article by Professors Nor-
man Dorsen and Joel Gora, in which they examined the impact
of property rights on First Amendment analysis during the
Burger Court years.6 They argued that during that period prop-
erty interests emerged as a significant factor in the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence, concluding that "when free
speech claims are weighed in the balance, property interests
determine on which side of the scales 'the thumb of the Court'
will be placed."7
This "thumb on the scales" has arguably become even weight-
ier in subsequent years, with the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence continuing to place an emphasis on property re-
lated values, at least as they relate to land.8 This can be seen
Endangered Species, and the Constitution, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 619, 619 (1995).
5. A much different type of speech-property relationship is discussed in a recent
article which argues that speech should be viewed as a property right of people. See
John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amend-
ment, 63 U. Cmi. L. REv. 49 (1996). Professor McGinnis notes that in recent decades
First Amendment theorists have largely focused on the First Amendment's essential
role in self-governance by guaranteeing open political dialogue and process in the face
of an expanding federal government. Id. at 50 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JuDIcIAL REvIEW 112 (1980)). He suggests that this
theory is now under attack, and argues that a more proper theoretical basis for the
First Amendment, and one more consistent with the amendment's original purpose, is
to view the First Amendment as a property right of the individual. Thus, he argues
that "the function of the First Amendment is not to promote the collective interest in
self-governance; . .. [but] to prohibit regulation of an important property right pecu-
liarly threatened by the government." Id. at 57.
Professor McGinnis's thesis does not directly relate to the speech-property rela-
tionship examined in this article. In a subtle way, however, it does suggest the po-
tential impact perceptions of property interests can have on speech rights.
6. Norman Dorsen & Joel M. Gora, Free Speech, Property, and the Court: Old
Values, New Balances, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 195 [hereinafter Dorsen & Gora].
7. Id. at 197.
8. Unlike this article, which focuses only on the relationship between real prop-
erty interests and speech, the Dorsen and Gora article also examined instances where
other forms of property ownership, such as media and financial wealth, related to
speech. They concluded that in these areas too the Burger Court gave deference to
property interests, either in expanding or limiting speech opportunities. See Dorsen &
Gora, supra note 6, at 207-12 (discussing corporate and campaign speech cases) and
215-19 (discussing access to private media cases). In a recent decision, however, Turn-
er Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), the Court did not give
any significance to property interests in regulating private media. In Turner, the
Court addressed the validity of a congressional mandate that cable operators devote
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in recent Court decisions such as City of Ladue v. Gilleo,9
where it recognized a right to display residential signs, and
Frisby v. Schultz,"0 which limited residential picketing, both of
which relied heavily upon property related concerns. At least
one other decision, City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for
Vincent" has more subtly suggested special protection for First
Amendment exercise associated with private property interests.
Perhaps most significant, the Court's recent retrenchment of
the "public forum" doctrine in cases like United States v.
Kokinda' and International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee' is largely grounded in an analysis focusing on the
"property rights" of the state as owner of the property.
The Court's recognition of property-related values in these
cases is not altogether new nor necessarily alarming. Each of
the above cases was built on early precedent, often proceeding
the Burger Court years, that to varying degrees recognized
property interests in analyzing speech rights. Moreover, the
accommodation of property values in analyzing First Amend-
ment rights is not necessarily inconsistent with traditional
perceptions of personal liberty. At times, property values might
support a more expansive reading of First Amendment exer-
cise. 4 Even where property interests limit speech rights, they
might reflect values which themselves relate to liberty and
autonomy.' Nevertheless, these cases demonstrate the fre-
quent ways that property interests might relate to First
Amendment rights and suggest increased judicial attention to
such relationships.
up to one-third of their stations to local broadcasters. I& at 2453. Although the Court
recognized there was not the showing of scarcity in this case that had justified intru-
sive regulation of broadcast media in other cases, it found the regulation to be a
valid, content-neutral restriction under the test set out in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968). Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469. This arguably reflects a significant
intrusion on nonreal property interests of cable operators.
9. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
10. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
11. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
12. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
13. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
14. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (greater protection of
speech connected with the home).
15. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (privacy and autonomy con-
cerns associated with the home sufficient to limit First Amendment exercise).
1997]
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This article will examine the relationship of property inter-
ests to First Amendment exercise, and in particular the Su-
preme Court's treatment of the ways property interests might
interact with First Amendment rights. Although where appro-
priate it will emphasize the increased attention to property
interests in recent years, the article's primary intent is to more
broadly examine the types of property-speech relationships that
have arisen and how the Court has viewed property values in
those various contexts. Beyond that, it will attempt to discern
the more basic values reflected in the Court's analysis and, to a
limited degree, critique the Court's treatment of the property-
speech relationship.
To some extent, of course, all First Amendment activity inevi-
tably intersects with property, whether it be the paper a
message is printed on or ownership of media such as radio or
television stations. This article, however, will focus on the rela-
tionship between speech and real property: the locational di-
mension of speech. In this respect, the article will examine
three general areas in which property interests and speech
intersect. First is where speech occurs on publicly owned prop-
erty and the property rights of the government are set against
First Amendment rights, traditionally analyzed under the rubric
of the "public forum" doctrine. Although not a dominant form of
analysis, the Court's retrenchment of the public forum doctrine
in recent years is in part explained by increased recognition of
property interests on the part of the government to control
public property. 8
A second area of property-speech relationship is the extent to
which speech interests can be limited to avoid interference with
private property interests. This most obviously occurs where a
property owner denies access to his or her property for speech
purposes. Although at one time the Court had recognized a
First Amendment access right to quasi-public property,'7 it
now has largely closed that door.18 The Court has also recog-
nized that, apart from the right to exclude, property owners
16. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
17. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
18. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972).
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have the right to be free from unreasonable speech intrusions
that interfere with the quiet enjoyment of property. This is
clearly most pronounced with the home," but also occurs with
non-residential property.
A third area of property-speech relationship is where property
interests do not limit, but instead enhance First Amendment
rights. Although this is the least developed of the three areas,
the Court has on occasion suggested that property interests
strengthen First Amendment claims," particularly where the
speech occurs on a person's own property. This was most clearly
seen in the Court's recent decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo,2'
where it emphasized values related to residential property in
recognizing a First Amendment right to residential lawn signs.
Not surprisingly, this article will suggest that the way in
which property values affect First Amendment rights in each of
the above categories turns on the relative importance of both
the First Amendment exercise and property interests involved.
To some extent, First Amendment exercise is quasi-fungible;
that is, other forms of First Amendment exercise can be substi-
tuted, though not perfectly, for the means of expression at is-
sue.' At other times, a particular manner or place of exercise
is uniquely important in serving First Amendment objectives,
with no adequate alternatives. Similarly, property interests vary
in their degree of importance. Some interests are subject to
substantial limitations, such as on use and enjoyment, where
courts have long subjected property interests to a reasonable-
ness balancing test.' Other interests, such as the right to ex-
clude, are viewed as more central to property, and are thus
provided significant protection.'
19. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
20. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
21. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
22. The Supreme Court's time, place and manner jurisprudence largely reflects
this fact, which provides that the state can put reasonable restrictions on where,
when or how speech is exercised. See, e.g., Heifron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(b) (1979), which defines nuisance
as unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Reasonable inter-
ferences must be tolerated.
24. This is reflected in both trespass law, see, e.g., ROGER A. CuNNINGHAm ET
19971
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Of particular importance in assessing the relationship of
property to speech is the extent property interests relate to
liberty and autonomy values. This is most clearly seen with
First Amendment exercise that intersects with the home, where
the Court has indicated that privacy, autonomy and liberty
interests associated with residential property substantially af-
fect First Amendment rights. This includes not only limiting
speech where it might intrude on residential privacy and au-
tonomy, but also enhancing speech when it is exercised in con-
nection with residential property.
Part One of this article will begin by discussing the manner
in which perceptions of government property interests affect
speech rights on public property. Part Two will then discuss the
Court's treatment of instances where First Amendment exercise
conflicts with private property interests. Part Three will then
examine where property interests enhance speech interests.
Finally, Part Four will provide some concluding observations.
I. SPEECH ON PUBLIC PROPERTY: THE PUBLIC
FORUM DOCTRINE
An initial area in which property rights intersect with free
speech concerns access to government property for speech pur-
poses. A significant amount of free speech jurisprudence has
addressed the extent to which individuals can use public prop-
erty for expression, which offers clear advantages to speakers
and has thus been a popular vehicle for communication. Impor-
tantly, public property often provides a cheap and convenient
form of communication to reach a large number of people. The
Court's doctrinal response to these concerns has become known
as the "public forum" doctrine. This doctrine has evolved to
determine the extent to which citizens can have access to public
property for speech purposes and the manner in which govern-
ment can regulate such access.
AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.1 (1984) ("the right physically to exclude others is the
most nearly absolute of the many property rights that flow from the ownership . . .
of land") and takings law, see, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (recognizing right to exclude others as one of the most es-
sential sticks in bundle of property rights).
[Vol. 31:1
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A full discussion of the public forum doctrine is beyond the
scope of this paper and has been frequently examined by oth-
ersY Rather, this article will examine the manner in which
property rights, in this context the property ownership rights of
the state, affect analysis of "public forum" issues. A property
rights analysis has not necessarily been the dominant analytical
mode, but has been a consistent theme throughout the
doctrine's development, both to recognize and to limit free
speech rights. In recent years, it has implicitly emerged as a
significant limitation on speech rights.
A. Development of the Public Forum Doctrine
Discussion of the public forum doctrine26 often begins with
Justice Holmes' opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Court
in Commonwealth v. Davis.' In Davis, the defendant was con-
victed of speaking in a commons area without a permit. Up-
holding the conviction, Justice Holmes noted in dictum that
even an absolute ban would have been valid, stating "[flor the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking
in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the
rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a pri-
vate house to forbid it in his house."'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, 9 largely adopt-
ing Justice Holmes' reasoning and emphasizing the state's right
to control its own property. In particular, the Court stated that
25. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 949; David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA
L. REV. 143 (1992); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems
in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109 (1986); Daniel A. Farber &
John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Con-
text in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). For two earlier and influential articles, see Geoffrey
R. Stone, Fora Americana, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 233; and Harry Kalven, Jr., The Con-
cept of the Public Forum Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Su. CT. REV. 1.
26. See, e.g., Day, supra note 25, at 150-52; Stone, supra note 25; Keith Werhan,
The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the Return to Formalism, 7 CARDOZO
L. REV. 335, 343-47 (1986).
27. 162 Mass. 510 (1895), affd sub nom. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43
(1897).
28. See Davis, 162 Mass. at 511.
29. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
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"the right to absolutely exclude all right to use necessarily
includes the authority to determine under what circumstances
such use may be availed of, as the greater power includes the
lesser."" Thus, the Supreme Court, as did Justice Holmes,
adopted what might be viewed as a pure property rights ap-
proach to the issue: the state has the right to control its prop-
erty the same as a private citizen, which includes the right to
deny access altogether for First Amendment activities.3' As
such, there was no public forum.
The first recognition of a public forum, in which citizens had
a right to some use of public property for public speech, came
nearly half a century later in 1939 in Hague v. CIO. 2 There,
the Court struck down an ordinance which prohibited public
meetings in streets and other places without a permit. In re-
jecting the permissibility of such an ordinance under Davis,
Justice Roberts' plurality opinion stated now famous dictum:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of as-
sembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been part of the privileges,
immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.'m
Justice Roberts proceeded to note that the privilege was not
absolute and could be regulated to avoid interference with pub-
lic interests; but it could not be altogether denied.'m
The public forum doctrine began with the above-quoted lan-
guage. As noted by both Professors Kalven and Stone, the rec-
ognition of a public forum in Hague was implicitly grounded in
30. See id. at 48. Professor Post has argued that Davis established that govern-
ment can control speech when it acts in a "proprietary capacity." Post, supra note 25,
at 1722-23. He suggests that a significant amount of public forum doctrine can be
expl ined by what he refers to as the Davis syllogism, with the major premise being
the above principle and the minor premise being whether in any particular instance
the government in fact acts in a proprietary capacity.
31. See Werhan, supra note 26, at 344-46 (Davis decided on basis of state's prop-
erty rights).
32. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
33. See id. at 515.
34. See id. at 515-16.
[Vol. 31:1
PROPERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
a property rights analysis.35 Citizens have a right to use
streets and parks for speech because they have been dedicated
to that purpose. This dedication theory, in essence, recognizes a
First Amendment right by "adverse possession"36 or "a kind of
First Amendment easement."37 As such, Hague's plurality did
not necessarily reject the property rights model of the Davis
Court; rather, it used the property related idea of a dedication
to establish a First Amendment right to the public forum.
In a subsequent series of decisions beginning with Schneider
v. New Jersey" in 1939, the Supreme Court firmly adopted
and began to define the concept of the public forum. In
Schneider, which involved four consolidated cases, the Court
struck down several ordinances which prohibited distributing
pamphlets on public streets. Although the Court recognized that
such activities can be regulated to avoid unnecessary interfer-
ence with state interests,39 it held that the state's interest in
preventing littering was insufficient to justify such a restriction
on free speech.' The Court further noted that the ordinances
could not be justified on the grounds that they allow leafletting
elsewhere, stating that "the streets are natural and proper
places for the dissemination of information and opinion."
4
'
Schneider and its progeny in the 1940s and 1950s established
that government must allow some accommodation, or minimum
access, for speech activities in the public forum. Although the
state can regulate the time, place, and manner of expression, it
cannot altogether exclude expression from places such as streets
and parks, except for compelling reasons. This was a natural
consequence of the Hague plurality's dedication theory and
appeared to be at least in part based on that rationale.' Many
35. See Stone, supra note 25, at 238; see also Dienes, supra note 25, at 112 (not-
ing Hague plurality did not reject property concepts); Post, supra note 25, at 1721-23
(same).
36. See id.
37. See Kalven, supra note 25, at 13.
38. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
39. See id. at 160-61. For example, the Court noted that the state could prohibit
a person from leafletting in the middle of the street, which would block traffic.
40. See id. at 162-63.
41. Id. at 163.
42. This was alluded to in Schneider and other cases by their emphasis on the
right to use public streets. See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163. Moreover, in Jamison v.
Texas, the Court explicitly rejected the argument that Davis permitted a flat ban. 318
1997]
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of these decisions, however, appeared to go beyond a mere dedi-
cation rationale and noted the important role such fora and
media play in the effective exercise of First Amendment rights
as a basis to require some accommodation. For example, the
Court noted the important role that streets and parks played in
reaching people. Similarly, in striking down bans on various
media of expression, such as sound trucks in public streets'
and door-to-door solicitation," the Court emphasized the im-
portant role they played in guaranteeing effective communica-
tion, especially for the poor. Although such concerns were, at
times, intertwined with notions of tradition and dedication, they
nevertheless suggested a separate rationale for permitting use
of public property: not only was it dedicated to some speech
use, it was necessary for effective communication.
By the mid-1960s the Court had firmly established and af-
firmed in a number of decisions the public forum nature of the
streets and parks. Although these decisions frequently turned
on factors other than the public forum, it was clear that state
ownership of such property did not automatically give the state
the right to limit speech. Moreover, the Court frequently em-
phasized the important role of streets, parks and similar fora in
the effective exercise of First Amendment rights. What was less
clear was whether the concept of the public forum extended
beyond such traditional fora, and in particular how such a
determination was made.
This issue was raised in Adderley v. Florida,' where the
Court in a narrow five-to-four decision upheld the criminal
trespass convictions of a group of students who staged a peace-
ful protest on the grounds of a county jail. The Court began its
analysis by noting that, unlike prior cases in which it had rec-
ognized First Amendment rights on public property, the jail-
house grounds were not normally open to the public.' The
U.S. 413, 416 (citing to the Hague plurality opinion). Thus, Jamison explicitly incor-
porated the Hague dedication rationale as at least one basis for insuring access to
streets and parks.
43. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
44. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
45. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
46. See id. at 41-42. In an earlier decision, Edwards v. South Carolina, the Court
held that students could not be prohibited from protesting on the sidewalks surround-
ing the State Capital grounds. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). In distinguishing Edwards, the
[Vol. 31:1
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Court also rejected the argument that the jail was a particular-
ly important and effective forum for the protests, noting that it
had never recognized a constitutional right to exercise First
Amendment rights "whenever and however and wherever" a
person might please. ' Importantly, the Court emphasized the
state's right to control its own property, stating:
Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents
Florida from even-handed enforcement of its general tres-
pass statute against those refusing to obey the sheriffs
order to remove themselves from what amounted to the
curtilage of the jailhouse. The state, no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property un-
der its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicat-
ed.. .. The United States Constitution does not forbid a
state to control the use of its own property for its own law-
ful nondiscriminatory use.'
The four dissenting justices, in an opinion by Justice Doug-
las, strongly rejected the property rights analysis foundation of
the majority opinion. Justice Douglas instead emphasized the
need for effective avenues of communication, especially for those
who might not have access to more conventional forms of ex-
pression.49 For such people, use of public property might be a
uniquely important means to petition the government. Although
he recognized that not all public places might be appropriate
for protests because of their dedicated purposes, he would focus
on whether the activity was "consistent with ... [the] purpose
Court in Adderley stated: '"fraditionally, state capital grounds are open to the public.
Jails, built for security purposes, are not." 385 U.S. at 41.
47. Id. at 47-48.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 49-51. Justice Douglas stated:
Conventional methods of petitioning may be, and often have been, shut
off to large groups of our citizens. Legislators may turn deaf ears; formal
complaints may be routed endlessly through a bureaucratic maze; courts
may let the wheels of justice grind very slowly. Those who do not control
television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in newspapers
or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a limited type of access
to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of
obstruction and harassment as long as the assembly and petition are
peaceable, as these were.
Id. at 50-51.
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of the property.""0 Thus, rather than focus on the ownership of
the state as the dispositive factor in access to nontraditional
fora, the four dissenting justices would focus on both the need
for effective avenues of expression and compatibility with in-
tended uses to determine whether public property can be used
for expressive activities. Justice Douglas was particularly con-
cerned that the majority's property-oriented analysis, in which
the state, as custodian of the property, was given the discretion
to dedicate property to speech purposes or not, put individuals
at the state's mercy."'
This tension between a property rights perspective, in which
the state can largely limit First Amendment rights on property
not previously dedicated to such use, and a more functional
analysis which primarily focuses on efficacy and compatibility
in determining rights, continued over the next several decades.
For a short time it appeared that the Court might totally es-
chew the property rights focus in favor of a compatibility stan-
dard, most clearly articulated by the Court's 1972 decision in
Grayned v. City of Rockford. 2 In Grayned, the Court upheld
an ordinance that prohibited anyone on property adjacent to
schools from making noise that would disturb the peace or good
order of the school.53 In recognizing this as a valid time, place
and manner regulation, the Court stated that "the crucial ques-
tion is whether the manner of expression is basically incompati-
ble with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time." '4 Grayned suggested that, rather than looking to see
whether public property was dedicated to speech purposes,
access should be determined by compatibility with the forum.
50. Id. at 54.
51. See id. at 54.
For to place such discretion in any public official, be he the "custodian"
of the public property or the local police commissioner, is to place those
who assert First Amendment rights at his mercy. It gives him the awe-
some power to decide whose ideas may be expressed and who shall be
denied a place to air their claims and petition their government.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Werhan, supra note 26, at 373-75 (discussing Adderley
and Douglas dissent).
52. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
53. See id. at 108.
54. Id. at 116-17.
[Vol. 31:1
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Despite this potential shift in thinking,55 the Court in sever-
al decisions in the 1970s applied a more property oriented anal-
ysis, suggesting the compatibility standard was limited in scope.
First, two years after Grayned, in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights,6 the Court held that a city could exclude certain ad-
vertising from city buses based on content. A four justice plu-
rality found it was not a First Amendment forum.57 The
plurality's analysis relied in part on a compatibility standard,
noting that "the nature of the forum and the conflicting inter-
ests" were important in determining the extent of First Amend-
ment rights.58 The plurality proceeded to discuss the unique
characteristics of the forum before it.59 The plurality also ap-
peared to rely on the state's property rights. The Court stated
at the end of the opinion that "[n]o First Amendment forum"
was involved and that the city had consciously limited access in
this casec° suggesting that the buses were the city's property
that it could control.6
55. In a 1974 article, Professor Geoffrey Stone suggested that Grayned marked a
clear break from common law property rights notions of the public forum, derived
from Hague, and instead established a compatibility standard to be applied to all
public property. -The streets, parks, public libraries and other publicly owned prop-
erty are all brought under the same roof." Stone, supra note 25, at 251-52. In a later
article, he suggested that his earlier analysis was premature. See Geoffrey R. Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 89 n.171 (1987); see also, Day,
supra note 25, at 156-57 (stating that in Grayned the Court adopted an "incompatibil-
ity standard," but that it was short-lived).
56. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
57. See id. at 304.
58. Id. at 302-03.
59. The plurality noted that this case did not involve open spaces, meeting halls,
parks, street comers or the like, but instead commerce by the city. As such, the city
was required to "provide rapid, convenient, pleasant, and inexpensive service to the
commuters of Shaker Heights." Id. at 303; see also Stone, supra note 25, at 252 (stat-
ing that plurality's analysis in Lehman seems consistent with Grayned compatibility
standard).
60. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304. Justice Douglas's concurring opinion, which was
necessary for a majority, relied on "captive audience" concerns to uphold the ordi-
nance, stating that "the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on
their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation
into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience." Id. at 307.
Earlier in his opinion, however, Douglas hinted at a property rights analysis, noting
that the fact the city owns the property "does not without more make it a forum."
Id. at 306.
61. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the Lehman plurality in
this fashion. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981).
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The property rights perspective was even more apparent in
Greer v. Spock,62 a 1976 decision. In Greer, the Court held that
a military base could bar people from entering the base to
make political speeches and distribute campaign literature.'
The Court found that the base was not a forum for First
Amendment purposes.' Again, the Court noted the unique
characteristics of a military base," but essentially grounded
the opinion on the right of the military to control its property
absent a dedication to First Amendment purposes. The Court
noted that unlike municipal streets and parks, military bases
have not traditionally served a free speech function,6 thus dis-
pelling any dedication based rights. The Court also quoted from
Adderley, noting that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner
of property, has power to preserve the property under its con-
trol for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." 7 At bottom,
the Court basically held that the military could control its own
property unless a decision was made to dedicate it to First
Amendment activities."
Despite the uncertainty regarding the extension of the public
forum doctrine, one area in which the Court was clear was in
the need for content-neutrality. 9 This applied not only to time,
place and manner regulations within established fora, but also
to equal access within newly dedicated fora. Thus, in several
decisions the Court noted that even if the state were not re-
quired to open a particular forum for expression, once it did it
could not exclude any speakers based on their content." In-
deed, the content-neutrality requirement became the Court's
62. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
63. See id. at 839-40.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 837-39.
66. See id. at 838.
67. Id. at 836 (quoting Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).
68. See Dorsen & Gora, supra note 6, at 228-29 (stating that Greer is an example
of the Burger Court's deference to the State's property interest to limit speech rights);
Post, supra note 25, at 1743 (stating that Greer resurrected the major premise of Da-
vis that government can control speech when acting in a proprietary capacity).
69. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
70. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (although university was not
necessarily required to allow any group to meet, once it allowed some groups to meet
it could not selectively exclude others based on content).
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primary analytical vehicle, allowing the Court to often evade
the more difficult question of whether speakers have a guaran-
teed right to a particular forum. In one sense, this theory acted
as a limitation on the state's property rights since, unlike pri-
vate property owners, it could not pick and choose among
speakers. Implicit in the Court's reasoning, however, was the
idea that the state could choose not to open up the forum at
all, thus affirming the state's property rights.7'
Going into the early 1980s, therefore, the Court had at vari-
ous times focused on state property rights theory and on com-
patibility concerns. In recognizing rights to traditional fora such
as streets and parks, the Court had not only noted the tradi-
tional dedication of such property to reasonable speech purpos-
es, but frequently analyzed their role in effective communica-
tion and compatibility with state interests. As analysis moved
to less traditional arenas, the Court often resorted to state
property rights in controlling its property. Though compatibility
was a factor in assessing rights within established public fora,
it was less clear what role it played in identifying new fora.
B. The Modern Public Forum Doctrine
Most commentators 72 recognize that the Supreme Court es-
tablished a modern public forum doctrine in its 1983 decision in
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Assn.73 In
Perry, two rival school unions had enjoyed equal access to an
interschool mail system.' One union then became the duly
elected exclusive bargaining agent, with a subsequent collective-
bargaining agreement granting that union, but no other union,
access to the interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes.75
Although other groups, such as church groups and Cub Scouts,
had access to the mail system,76 no other union was granted
71. See, e.g., id. at 277 (suggesting that the university did not need to open up
the forum at all).
72. See, e.g., Day, supra note 25, at 160-63; RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NowAK, 4 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 306-09 (2d ed. 1992); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 987 (2d ed. 1988).
73. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
74. See id. at 39.
75. See id. at 38-40.
76. See id. at 39 & n.2.
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access. The rival union sued, claiming that the regulation vio-
lated its First Amendment rights.
77
The Court began its analysis by attempting to synthesize
previous cases and announcing that there are three categories
of fora for speech purposes. First are traditional public fora,
such as streets and parks, which "have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public."v8 Although the state may
enact reasonable time, place and manner of expression regula-
tions of such fora, it may not prohibit all communicative activi-
ties. 9
Second are designated fora, which is public property "the
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity."8 ° Even though the state might not have been re-
quired to open such fora for speech, as long as it provides such
a forum it is subject to the standards governing traditional
fora.8 The most important requirement is that access be con-
tent-neutral.82 Examples of such designated fora cited by the
Court were university meeting facilities,' school board meet-
ings," and a municipal theater.85
The third category of public property identified in Perry is
the nonforum, property "which is not by tradition or designation
a forum for public communication."8 Such property is not a
public forum for speech purposes, and restrictions on speech
will be upheld as long as they are "reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression."7 The Court explicitly grounded recog-
nition of such nonfora on the state's interest in controlling its
property, quoting Adderley that "[t]he State, no less than a
77. See id. at 39.
78. Id. at 45.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 45-46.
82. See id. In a footnote the Court noted that a public forum may be created for
limited purposes, thus permitting exclusion of speakers outside of those purpose. See
id. at 45 n.7.
83. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
84. See City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Pub. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
85. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
86. 460 U.S. at 46.
87. See id.
[Vol. 31:1
PROPERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated."'
The Court then applied this test to the facts before it, con-
cluding that the internal mail system was a nonforum. It was
not open to the public by tradition89 and the school board had
designated the system as being at most, a limited forum that
would not extend to the excluded union."° The Court further
found the regulation to be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.9
Perry signalled a significant shift in public forum analysis by
its pronouncement of the highly formalistic tripartite test. As
noted by a number of commentators,92 after Perry, the category
of property in which the regulation falls is critical. Although
the Court's synthesis of its prior cases was not necessarily
inaccurate, it suggested a more formalistic approach than had
previously been employed with the category of property being
the critical component. The importance of the fora in ensuring
effective opportunities for speech and compatibility becomes
secondary; the type of property involved becomes outcome deter-
minative.
Significantly, Perry implicitly recognized property right princi-
ples as being largely determinative of First Amendment exer-
cise allowed on public property. Only in the first category of
traditional fora, such as streets and parks, did the Court recog-
nize a guaranteed access for communicative purposes. In doing
so, the Court quoted the classic language of Hague, that streets
and parks "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions." As noted earlier, this suggests a
dedication theory or First Amendment easement by longstand-
ing use.
88. Id. (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) and Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966)).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 47-48.
91. See id. at 48-54.
92. See, e.g., ROTUNDA & NOWAK , supra note 72, at 309; see also, Day, supra note
25, at 176.
93. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
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The other two categories of public property identified in
Perry, the designated forum and the nonforum, are largely
subject to the State's property interest as owner. Although once
established the designated forum is subject to the same rules as
a traditional forum, the Court stated that such fora are not
necessarily required to be opened to the public in the first
place.94 Moreover, the Court stated that the "State is not
required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facili-
ty, '95 indicating the State's substantial degree of control in
deciding how the property will be used. As noted earlier, the
concept of the nonforum was explicitly grounded on the State's
right to control its property similar to a private property
owner.
96
Admittedly, the State's rights as owner of the property fall
short of a private owner's rights. Unlike private owners, the
State is not free to pick and choose who will speak on its prop-
erty. Moreover, even on nonforum property, state restrictions
must be reasonable, thus denying the State the right to arbi-
trarily or oppressively restrict access. Nevertheless, recognizing
the property interests of the State as the owner seems to be a
significant, if not the major, analytical ground in the Perry
framework.97
The ascendancy of a property rights theory of the public
forum was further affirmed two years after Perry in Cornelius
v. NCAAP Legal Defense and Education Fund." There the
Court reviewed the validity of a presidential order which ex-
cluded various advocacy groups from participating in the Com-
bined Federal Campaign (CFC), an annual charity drive con-
ducted in the federal workplace. The advocacy groups, which
had previously been allowed to participate in the campaign,
challenged their exclusion as constituting a content-based re-
striction in violation of the First Amendment.'
94. See id. at 45.
95. Id. at 46.
96. See id.
97. See Werhan, supra note 26, at 410-11; Post, supra note 25, at 1749-50 (Perry
decisively reaffirmed categorical framework of Greer).
98. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
99. See id. at 790-95.
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After first identifying the relevant forum as the CFC, rather
than the federal workplace,"° the Court proceeded to follow
the Perry tripartite test as its framework for analysis. °1 What
was most significant about Cornelius, however, was that it
established a "government-intent" standard to determine what
type of forum was involved.0 2 In determining whether the
CFC was a dedicated forum, the Court stated that "[tihe gov-
ernment does not create a public forum by inaction or by per-
mitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse." 3 It noted that it
looks to policy and practice for such intent, as well as possibly
inferring intent from "the nature of the property and its com-
patibility with expressive activity."' °  However, the Court
stressed that it will not find a public forum "in the face of clear
evidence of a contrary intent."0 5 On this basis, the Court con-
cluded that there was no intent to create a forum.' ° Thus,
the government's actions were subject to the lenient standards
governing nonfora, which were met.' 7
Cornelius thus established government intent as the basis for
determining which category of property is involved. Although
this was arguably implied in Perry, it was undeniably stated in
Cornelius. This does not give government carte blanche power,
since courts can clearly infer intent from actions, policies, and
compatibility. Furthermore, if a designated forum is found, it
will be subject to some scrutiny. But it does indicate that ulti-
mate control, with the exception of traditional fora such as
streets and parks, lies with the state itself. This affirms that
the Court views questions of the public forum as essentially
flowing from the rights and decisions of the government as
owner of the property."°
100. See id. at 801-02.
101. See id. at 802.
102. See id.; Day, supra note 25, at 166; Post, supra note 25, at 1756.
103. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 803.
106. See id. at 804-06.
107. See id. at 809-11.
108. See Dienes, supra note 25, at 119 (suggesting that Cornelius "reflects the
property orientation embodied in Adderley and its progeny").
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The extent to which this approach, focusing on the state's
property rights, might be taken is seen in two more recent
decisions, United States v. Kokinda'2° and International Soci-
ety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee."' Whereas previous
cases in which the Court emphasized the state's right to control
its own property often involved clearly nontraditional areas,
such as jails or military bases, both Lee and Kokinda involved
fora arguably similar to streets and parks. The Court in Lee,
and a plurality in Kokinda, applied a property analysis to limit
speech."' Both decisions reflected deep divisions on the Court,
however, and lend uncertainty as to how far the Perry analysis
can be pursued.
In the first case, Kokinda, two volunteers for the National
Democratic Committee set up a table on a sidewalk, near a
post office entrance, in order to solicit contributions and sell
and distribute literature." The sidewalk was located entirely
on Postal Service property and was the only means of entrance
to the building from the parking lot." Postal regulations pro-
hibited any solicitation from postal premises.14 After receiving
numerous complaints, the postmaster asked the two to leave,
but they refused." They were ultimately arrested and con-
victed, and appealed their arrest and conviction on First
Amendment grounds."'
Once again, the Court began its analysis with the Perry tri-
partite test."' As would be expected, the respondents argued
that sidewalks were traditional public fora and must accommo-
date First Amendment speech."' Indeed, the Court itself sev-
en years earlier in United States v. Grace," had held that
109. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
110. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
111. See Michael J. Mellis, Modifications to the Traditional Public Forum Doctrine:
United States v. Kokinda and its Aftermath, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167, 184-85,
189 (1991) (suggesting property rights analysis in Kokinda). But see Day, supra note
25, at 191 (stating Kokinda "more sophisticated" than property rights analysis).
112. 497 U.S. at 723.
113. See id.
114. See 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(h)(1) (1989).
115. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 723.
116. See id. at 723-24.
117. See id. at 726-27.
118. See id. at 727.
119. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
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the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building were
traditional public fora for First Amendment purposes.'2
The plurality, however, stated that the postal sidewalk in
Kokinda did not have the characteristics of traditional side-
walks and thus did not qualify as a traditional forum."2 Un-
like the sidewalk in Grace, which the Court had labelled "indis-
tinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C.,"
the postal sidewalk in Kokinda was not adjacent to a thorough-
fare. ' Instead, it was constructed solely for those members of
the public engaged in postal business.' In that sense the
plurality believed the facts were more similar to the military
base in Greer v. Spock,' where the internal streets and side-
walks did not qualify as traditional fora. 6
The plurality further concluded that the postal sidewalk did
not fit into the second category of a designated public forum.
Although it recognized that some individuals had been permit-
ted to "leaflet, speak, and picket" on the premises, it stated
that allowing some speech activities does not constitute a dedi-
cation.' Quoting Cornelius, it stated that "[t]he government
does not create a public forum by... permitting limited dis-
course, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum
for public discourse."' Under this standard, the plurality not-
ed that the Postal Service had never expressly dedicated its
sidewalks to First Amendment activity; rather, postal regula-
tions only expressly permitted communication on designated
bulletin boards.' Thus, according to the plurality, there was
no clear intent to dedicate the sidewalks to speech activity.
The plurality concluded that the postal sidewalks were
nonpublic fora and speech restrictions must simply be tested for
120. See id. at 179-80.
121. 497 U.S. at 727-28.
122. 461 U.S. at 179.
123. 497 U.S. at 727.
124. See id.
125. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
126. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 729 (quoting Greer, 424 U.S. at 838).
127. Id. at 730.
128. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 802 (1985)).
129. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
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their reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.30 In finding
the solicitation ban reasonable, the plurality primarily focused
on the nature of the property, and the potentially disruptive
impact that solicitation might have on postal business. The
Court noted both the unique mission and business environment
of the postal service and the distinctive characteristics of solici-
tation on others.'' In a sense, therefore, the plurality applied
a compatibility analysis in upholding the regulation, though in
a very deferential manner.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, necessary for a majori-
ty, avoided deciding whether the postal sidewalk was a public
forum. Instead, he assumed without deciding that it was a
designated forum but concluded that the postal regulation was
a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction for such a
forum. 2 He expressed some concern, however, about the
plurality's conclusion that the postal sidewalk was not a public
forum, noting that it is "essential to protect public places where
traditional modes of speech and forms of expression can take
place" and "there remains a powerful argument that, because of
the wide range of activities that the Government permits to
take place on this postal sidewalk, it is more than a
nonforum."'3
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the four dissenting
justices even more severely took issue with the plurality's anal-
ysis, arguing that application of the modern Perry tripartite test
to traditional fora such as sidewalks makes little sense and
"obfuscates" the issue."M They particularly disagreed with
those aspects of the plurality's opinion that concerned the
government's intent to create a forum, criticizing the plurality's
"particularized inquiry into the precise nature" of the forum' s
130. See id.
131. See id. at 732-33.
132. See id. at 738 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984)).
133. Id. at 737.
134. See id. at 741, 746-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that "whatever the
proper public forum doctrine to novel situations like fund-raising drives in the federal
workplace.., or the internal mail systems of public schools... we ought not
unreflectively transfer principles of analysis developed in those specialized and diffi-
cult contexts to traditional forums such as streets, sidewalks, and parks.").
135. See id. at 740-42, 744-45 (quoting Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81
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and stating that "why the sidewalk was built is not salient.""6
They instead suggested that public access to sidewalks and
other traditional fora is not a matter of government "grace" but
inherent in the nature of the forum.
137
The Court's most recent public forum decision, International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,'m again showed
a badly divided Court on the manner in which the Perry tripar-
tite test should apply to what was arguably a more traditional
forum, this time an airport terminal. In that case, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, which owned and oper-
ated three major airports in the New York area, passed sepa-
rate regulations banning solicitation and distribution of litera-
ture within terminal areas. The Krishna Society, a religious
organization actively engaged in solicitation and distribution at
airports, challenged the regulations as violating the First
Amendment.'39
In two separate, but closely related cases, the Court upheld
the antisolicitation regulation, but struck down the regulation
banning distribution of literature within the terminal.' Im-
portantly, however, a majority of the Court held that the Perry
test was applicable and found that the airport terminal was a
nonpublic forum, indicating a strong property rights perspective.
At the same time, however, four justices vigorously dissented
from the Perry property rights approach. Moreover, Justice
O'Connor, though joining the majority in finding the terminal a
nonforum, found the ban on literature distribution unreason-
able, adding further confusion to the outcome by suggesting
greater scrutiny of nonforum restrictions than previously re-
quired under the tripartite test.
Chief Justice Rehnquist first wrote an opinion for a five
member majority in which the Court upheld the ban on solicita-
tion. He began his discussion once again with the Perry tripar-
(1988)).
136. Id. at 744 (emphasis in original).
137. See id. at 745.
138. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
139. See id. at 674-76.
140. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830
(1992) (per curiam) (invalidating leafletting ban); International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (upholding solicitation ban).
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tite analysis, concluding that it was a nonpublic forum."4 The
Court began its discussion of whether the terminal was a tradi-
tional public forum by citing Hague v. CIO,' where it said
the public forum status flowed from use of streets and parks
from time immemorial for expressive activities.' It further
noted that the government does not create a public forum by
inaction or opening the property to the public; rather, there
must be a clear governmental intent to create a forum.'"
The Court then proceeded to conclude that neither by tradi-
tion nor intentional dedication did airport terminals qualify as
public fora.' First, given the relative lateness of air travel in
our history, airport terminals have clearly not been dedicated to
First Amendment uses from "time immemorial." Further, even
within the short history of aviation, the practice of using termi-
nals for First Amendment activities is recent." Finally, the
court found no intent or purpose to dedicate the terminals for
speech.'47 As such, airport terminals are neither traditional
nor dedicated fora, and to be valid, regulations need only be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
The five person majority proceeded to find that the solicita-
tion ban was a reasonable regulation and therefore valid.'
Four of the five justices also found the leafletting ban reason-
able."4  Justice O'Connor, however, left the majority at this
point and concluded, in a separate opinion, that the ban on
distribution was unreasonable. 50 Although she clearly agreed
that the terminal was a nonforum,"5' she applied some rigor
141. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 679.
142. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
143. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 679.
144. See id. at 679-80.
145. See id. at 680-83. M"us, we think that neither by tradition nor purpose can
the terminals be described as satisfying the standards we have previously set out for
identifying a public forum." Id. at 683.
146. See id. at 680.
147. See id. at 680-81.
148. See id. at 683-84.
149. The ban on leafletting actually came before the Court as a separate case,
thus adding to the Court's confusion. See Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam). Thus, the four person opinion ar-
guing in favor of the ban appeared as a dissent in the subsequent decision. Id. at
831-32.
150. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
151. Not only did Justice O'Connor join the five person majority which held the
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to the reasonableness requirement for a nonpublic forum and
found the distribution ban lacking.
The remaining four justices strongly rejected the majority's
public forum analysis. 2 In particular, those justices severely
criticized the Perry forum analysis as giving government the
"almost unlimited authority to restrict speech on its property"
by simply stating a non-speech purpose, and as a consequence
leaves no room for the development of new public fora.53 In-
stead, they suggested an analysis similar to the old compatibili-
ty standard, stating: "If the objective, physical characteristics of
the property at issue and the actual public access and uses that
have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive
activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses,
the property is a public forum.""-
The Court remained deeply divided in Lee concerning the
applicability of the Perry property focused analysis to all public
property. On the one hand, with the replacement of Justice
Marshall by Justice Thomas, a five member majority was will-
ing to apply an intent standard to even relatively open areas
such as terminals. This suggests a significant recognition of the
state's property rights as determining public forum questions.
At the same time, the four remaining justices even more clearly
rejected the property rights and intent analysis. Adding more
uncertainty to the analysis was Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Lee, which, while applying the property rights analysis of
Perry, suggested a degree of scrutiny to nonpublic fora greater
than had previously been recognized. Thus, while the property
rights analysis has arguably come to dominate public forum
questions, its current status is precarious at best.
terminal was a nonforum, but she separately reiterated that under the Perry forum
analysis terminals were a nonforum. See id. at 686 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in the solicitation ban case, the
first section of which strongly criticized the majority's public forum analysis. See id.
at 693-703 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined
this part of the concurrence. Justice Kennedy would have upheld the solicitation ban
as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction within a public forum. See id. at
703-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The other justices would have invalidated it. See id.
at 709-16 (Souter, J., dissenting). All four found the leafletting ban invalid, which,
together with Justice O'Connor, formed a majority.
153. Lee, 505 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also, Day, supra note 25, at 196 (not-
ing similarity to the Grayned "compatibility standard").
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C. Summary
As suggested by the above discussion, a property rights anal-
ysis, focusing on the state's right to control use of and access to
its own property, has long played a role in the public forum
question. This is not surprising, since the state, like any other
property owner, clearly has rights attendant to property own-
ership. The modern forum doctrine, however, initiated in Perry
and reflected in the tripartite test, has arguably made the
state's property rights the dominant focus of current analysis.
This is particularly seen in the test's formalistic approach to
whether state owned property is subject to First Amendment
use, which looks to see whether the property has been tradi-
tionally or intentionally designated a forum for speech purposes.
Thus, even though the state is not afforded the same degree of
protection as a private owner, the test strongly presumes the
state's right to control property to the extent it has not given
up such rights. This "property rights" hold on public forum
analysis is quite tenuous, however, as the Kokinda and Lee
decisions reflect a deep division within the Court concerning
whether a property rights perspective or a compatibility ap-
proach best addresses the difficult policy issues inherent in the
public forum doctrine.
Certainly any resolution of public forum questions must rec-
ognize and protect the state's status as property owner to some
extent. Just as a private owner, the state has an interest in
assuring that property can be. used for its intended purposes
and any substantial interference with dedicated uses of state
property should be permitted only for the most compelling of
reasons. The issue, however, is not whether to accommodate
state property interests, but rather, how to best do it while at
the same time accommodating First Amendment interests.'
In this respect, the Court's current emphasis on property
rights is potentially problematic for two reasons. First, the
155. Cf. Stone, supra note 55, at 93 ("right to engage in expressive activities on
public property should turn not on the common law property rights of the govern-
ment... but on a reasonable accommodation of the competing speech and govern-
mental interests"); Werhan, supra note 26, at 423-26 (arguing for rejection of Perry
formalism and return to Grayned compatability test).
[Vol. 31:1
PROPERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Court seems to assume the property interests of the state are
largely the same as that of a private citizen, and that is not
altogether accurate. In some respects, of course, the state's
property interests are similar to that of a private owner. In
particular, the state like a private owner has an interest in
being free from unreasonable interference with its property.
But in several other respects, publicly owned property is
arguably different than private property and thus not necessi-
tating the same treatment. Depending on the nature of the
property in question, expectations of control and the right to
exclude are less than what a private owner would have. Public-
ly owned property is often open to the public with diminished
expectations of privacy or exclusion. 6 Thus, the normal ex-
pectation that others cannot be on the property is considerably
less if not altogether absent with many forms of public proper-
ty.
Related to this, is the fact that publicly owned property does
not have the same autonomy concerns attached to it as private
property. As noted by various commentators, the right to con-
trol private property reflects not only utilitarian values, but
also values closely associated with autonomy and person-
hood.'"7 Such values are arguably most threatened when a
person is unable to control what is done and who enters their
property." Thus, although a private property owner's use of
property might well be limited to serve societal objectives, such
objectives generally do not justify physical invasion of the
property. 9 The need to respect autonomy is arguably an im-
156. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the Court stated
"[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it." Id. at 506.
157. See MARGARET J. RADIN, RERUERPREMG PROPERTY 35-71 (1995). Professor
Radin has proposed a personhood theory of property, which argues that the law has
and should provide greater protection when property is "bound up with personhood."
158. Cf Frank L Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1228 (1967)
(noting "[tlhe psychological shock, the emotional protest, the symbolic threat to all
property and security" that may occur when government physically invades private
property).
159. Some societal objectives would require limiting a private property owner's
right to exclude, such as prohibiting a retail store from discriminating on the basis of
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portant component in giving private property owners the right
to control access to and use of property by others.
No such concerns exist for state property. Although the state
has a very significant interest in avoiding interference with the
dedicated use of its property, neither its personhood nor autono-
my is threatened when others are permitted on its property.
The state's interests are principally functional, as important as
they are. This suggests that the state's interests should be
protected in a functional fashion, that focuses on avoiding
unnecessary interferences with the property's dedicated use.
This, of course, doesn't mean the state should have no rights as
owner of property; it clearly must. It does suggest, however,
that an analytical model that presupposes the same right to
control as a private owner is flawed, since significant differenc-
es do exist."6
A second significant and related problem of grounding public
forum analysis in a "property rights" approach is its distributive
impact on speech opportunities. Implicit in the Court's property
rights focus is that the state need not subsidize speech opportu-
nities; rather, an individual's own resources should be used for
speech. This places a greater emphasis on private property's
role in effective communication. Thus, an indirect consequence
of the modern public forum doctrine's emphasis on the state's
property rights is to elevate the importance of private property
in speech. Indeed, this arguably coincides with the Court's sug-
gestion that use of private property might have special constitu-
tional significance.''
An obvious concern is that a shift away from public to pri-
vate property to accommodate speech will have a disproportion-
race. See Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1283 (1996) (arguing that concept of private properties
must be defined in relation to competing societal concerns and owner of retail busi-
ness cannot exclude others based on race). Such a limitation on a private owner's
right to exclude would usually occur with property open to the public.
160. See Post, supra note 25, at 1797-98 (noting differences between private and
public property and stating that with public forum focus should be an "instrumental"
nature of property).
161. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
811 (1984) (banning signs on public property, but not on private property is disparate
treatment that is justified because of "It]he private citizen's interest in controlling the
use of his own property").
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ate impact on the poor. Access to public forum property for
expression has long been a means by which the less advantaged
can have some minimal opportunity for expression." By
treating all but the most clearly traditional public fora as the
state's property to control as it pleases, the Court significantly
limits speech opportunities. This is particularly true as new and
distinct types of public fora emerge in society.
The extent of this distributive impact should not be overem-
phasized. Certainly, important speech opportunities remain,
even with a property oriented analysis. Moreover, significant
imbalances are inevitable because of the role money plays in
effective communication and the great disparity of wealth distri-
bution in our society. No matter what type of public forum
doctrine the Court adopts, there will remain significant differ-
ences in people's ability to communicate because of significant
differences in the resources they can devote to speech. Never-
theless, by emphasizing the state's right to control its property,
and thus denying access to state property for expression, the
Court is clearly moving towards placing a greater reliance on
private property in facilitating First Amendment exercise.
These two concerns-the distinctive nature of public property
and the distributive impact of a property rights approach--do
not mean that the state should have no rights as an owner of
property. As noted above, any public forum doctrine must seri-
ously protect against unreasonable interferences with use of
state property. The concerns do suggest, however, that an over-
emphasis on the state's right as property owner is problematic
and unnecessary.1" Rather, a compatibility analysis, at least
with property that is arguably analogous to more traditional
fora, better serves First Amendment interests while helping
ensure protection of legitimate state interests.
162. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door dis-
tribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.");
TRIBE, supra note 72, §§ 12-24.
163. See Stone, supra note 55, at 93 (access to public property for speech should
not turn on property rights of the government but on "a reasonable accommodation of
the competing speech and governmental interests").
19971
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
II. SPEECH AGAINST PROPERTY
A second major way in which property interests might affect
speech is where First Amendment exercise conflicts with prop-
erty interests. This might occur in one of two general ways.
First, is where a speaker seeks physical access to property and
thus, interferes with the property owner's right to exclusive
possession. Second, is where speech interferes with use and
enjoyment of land. This article will treat each of these two
issues separately.
A. Access Issues
The most apparent way in which property rights limit free
speech is by the right to exclude others, including those seeking
to exercise First Amendment rights, from property. The Court
has frequently identified the right to exclude others as one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of property rights.' It
is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has often noted in
dicta that private property owners, especially homeowners, are
free to exclude others from their property."6 Indeed, in recog-
nizing the state's right to control nonforum public property the
Court has often drawn an analogy to the right of private prop-
erty owners to exclude others."
A private property owner's right to exclude First Amendment
activity from the property in most instances is quite easy to
understand. On the one hand, there are strong expectations
that one can control use and access to property. This is particu-
larly strong with regard to residential property, where privacy
and autonomy concerns require that a property owner be able
to deny access to the property.'67 Conversely, ample alterna-
164. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
165. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
166. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47
(1966).
167. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("well-being, tranquility,
and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order") (quoting Carey v. Brown
447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring) (home is sometimes "the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the
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rive forms of expression would usually exist, since only a rela-
tively minor area has been restricted. Thus, any restraint on
expression would be very minor when compared to the signifi-
cant property and privacy interests affected.
Occasionally, however, the balance is not so one-sided. This
would usually occur where private property is generally open to
the public, thus decreasing privacy expectations and making
more minimal any interference with dedicated use. Moreover,
alternative channels of communication might be less effective
where the property encompasses a large area or duplicates in
some fashion a public fora. For these reasons the Court has, in
a series of decisions, addressed the issue of under what circum-
stances First Amendment concerns might require that a person
be permitted on private property for expressive purposes. Al-
though in several early decisions the Court established signifi-
cant First Amendment access rights to private property, in later
decisions it substantially limited such rights."
This issue was first brought before the Court in 1946 in
Marsh v. Alabama.69 In Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness attempt-
ed to enter a privately owned company town to distribute reli-
gious literature. The town was owned by a shipbuilding compa-
ny, but in all other respects resembled a typical American
town, consisting of residences, regular streets and sidewalks,
and a business section. Title to all property, including streets
and sidewalks, was held by the private company. 70 On that
basis, the town refused to let the Jehovah's Witness distribute
literature, noting that it controlled access to the town because
it was privately owned property.Y
In a five-to-three decision, the Supreme Court held that the
appellant had a First Amendment right to distribute literature
in the town despite its private ownership.' In rejecting the
sick).
168. See generally Dorsen & Gora, supra note 6, at 220-26, for a discussion of how
the Burger Court's property rights bias limited the earlier recognized First
Amendment access right to quasi-public property.
169. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
170. See id. at 502-03.
171. See id. at 503-04.
172. See id. at 508-09.
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argument that the company's private property interest settled
the question, the Court stated:
The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to
control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the
right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests.
We cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not al-
ways mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.'73
The Court proceeded to note that the town of Chickasaw func-
tioned as a normal town in almost every respect, and therefore,
the public had "an identical interest" in ensuring that "the
channels of communication remain free." 74  In such
circumstances any property interests that exist cannot deny
reasonable First Amendment activities. Marsh thus recognized
that at least in some circumstances, most notably where private
property acts as the equivalent of a town, a property owner's
right to exclude must yield to First Amendment rights.
More than two decades later, in Amalgamated Food Employ-
ees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,75 the Court ex-
tended the rationale of Marsh to peaceful picketing of a store
located in a large shopping center. In that case, between four
and thirteen people picketed a newly opened supermarket, car-
rying signs saying that it was a non-union market and that em-
ployees did not receive union benefits. 6 The picketing was
carried out almost entirely in the parcel pickup area immedi-
ately adjacent to the store and on an adjacent parking lot, ar-
eas that were privately owned by the shopping center.' 7
Because the picketing was peaceful and for lawful purposes,
the case presented the issue of whether state laws against
trespass to private property could be used to bar First
Amendment picketing on the supermarket property. In holding
that there was a right to picket on the shopping center land,
173. Id. at 505-06 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 507.
175. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
176. See id. at 311.
177. See id.
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the Court relied strongly on its previous holding in Marsh. In
particular, the Court stated that "the shopping center here is
clearly the functional equivalent of the business district"' 8 in
Marsh. Thus, because the "shopping center serve[d] as the com-
munity business block 'and [was] freely accessible and open to
the people in the area and those passing through," the state
could not, through its trespass laws, prohibit First Amendment
rights to be exercised on such property. 9 The Court also em-
phasized that the picketing was directed at only one business
within the shopping center, and that alternative sites would be
less effective, and in some cases dangerous.'
Together, Marsh and Logan Valley seemed to establish that
where privately owned property served a quasi-public function,
it was subject to some right of access for First Amendment
purposes. Thus, even though in most instances a private prop-
erty owner could refuse entry to those desiring to exercise First
Amendment rights, such a right of refusal was not automatic
simply by virtue of one's status as property owner. Rather, the
characteristics of the property in question and, in particular, its
openness to the public, together with the adequacy of alterna-
tives, would dictate questions of access.
These First Amendment in-roads on a property owner's right
to exclude were short-lived, however. Four years after Logan
Valley, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,8' the Court substantially
limited the potential reach of its earlier decisions when it held
that a shopping center could ban handbilling unrelated to ac-
tivity in the center.8 2 In that case, several young people at-
tempted to distribute handbills inviting people to a meeting to
protest the draft and Vietnam War. Although their activity was
peaceful and orderly, they were told that they were trespassing
and must stop distribution of the handbills."
178. Id. at 318.
179. Id. at 319-20.
180. See id. at 321-22.
181. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
182. See id. at 570.
183. See id. at 553-56.
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Both the district court"u and court of appeals" held that,
under the Supreme Court's previous decisions in Marsh and
Logan Valley, the shopping center was the functional equivalent
of a public business district and could not be completely closed
to expressive activities. The Supreme Court reversed, however,
and held that there was no First Amendment right to distribute
handbills in a privately owned shopping center. In doing so, it
distinguished Logan Valley by noting that the speech in that
case concerned activity at the center itself; thus, there were no
other reasonable means of communicating the message to the
intended audience.'86 Conversely, in Lloyd, the handbilling
was altogether unrelated to the locale. The Court also distin-
guished Marsh by noting that a shopping center was not the
functional equivalent of an entire town.87
The Court then proceeded to what it considered to be the
central issue in the case: whether a person may exercise First
Amendment rights on private property contrary to the wishes of
the owner."s The Court said no, stressing the private property
rights of the shopping center in controlling the types of activi-
ties that might occur on the property.'89 It specifically rejected
the argument that by opening the property to the public there
was an implied dedication to First Amendment activity, noting
that property does not lose its private character "merely be-
cause the public is generally invited to use it for designated
purposes." "9 The focus of analysis thus shifted from the quasi-
public nature of the property emphasized in Marsh and Logan
Valley to the rights of the private property owner emphasized
in Lloyd.'9'
Although the Court in Lloyd was careful to distinguish rather
than overrule Logan Valley, the Court's emphasis in Lloyd on
184. See Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128, 130 (1970).
185. See Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 446 F.2d 545 (1971).
186. See Tanner, 407 U.S. at 563-64.
187. See id. at 569.
188. See id. at 567.
189. See id. at 568.
190. Id. at 569.
191. See Dorsen & Gora, supra note 6, at 222, stating that whereas in Marsh
speech had a preferred position over property rights, in Lloyd "the priority of speech
over property had yielded to a parity between speech and property, if not a prefer-
ence for the latter."
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the shopping center's private property rights is difficult to rec-
oncile with the Logan Valley decision. Indeed, four years later,
in Hudgens v. NLRB,'92 the Court specifically stated that the
rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Lloyd decision."3
On that basis, the Court held that striking members of a union
did not have a First Amendment right to enter a shopping
center to advertise a strike against their employer, whose store
was located in the shopping center.' In so holding, the Court
effectively said that a private property owner's right to exclude
others outweighs any First Amendment rights, even when inad-
equate alternatives exist.
The combined result of Lloyd and Hudgens is to place a prop-
erty owner's right to exclude others above First Amendment
concerns in almost all cases. Both decisions appear to affirm
the continuing viability of Marsh, which involved a company
town which "was performing the full spectrum of municipal
powers and stood in the shoes of the State." 5 As a practical
matter, however, such situations are quite limited, with compa-
ny towns and similar institutions largely a relic of the past.
Conversely, shopping centers have increasingly become an inte-
gral part of the American experience. The streets and sidewalks
of a downtown business district, perhaps the quintessential
concept of a traditional public forum, have been replaced by
shopping centers. 6 However, the Court has clearly limited
any concomitant shift in First Amendment interests.
192. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
193. The Court in Hudgens noted that Lloyd did not overrule Logan Valley, but
concluded that "the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Lloyd cannot be squared with
the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Logan Valley." Id. at 518. In particular, the
Court stated that a true First Amendment forum must be content-neutral. See id. at
520. Thus, the Court concluded that "if the respondents in the Lloyd case did not
have a First Amendment right to enter that shopping center to distribute handbills
concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case did not have a First
Amendment right to enter this shopping center for the purpose of advertising their
strike against the Butler Shoe Co." Id. at 520-21. Even beyond this content-neutrality
analysis, however, the Court's strong emphasis in Lloyd on private property rights is
difficult to reconcile with the Logan Valley result.
194. See id. at 520-21.
195. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).
196. See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty
Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 766-68 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995) (discussing
growth of malls and decline of downtown districts).
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Striking the balance in this way, giving a property owner's
interest in excluding others clear preference over speech inter-
ests, might be criticized on two grounds. First, as suggested
above, the private shopping mall has become the equivalent of
the early downtown district. This, in turn, might suggest the
need for a similar shift in the provision of oppoitunities for
expression, especially in light of the Court's frequent focus on
the need for adequate alternatives in speech cases." This, in
itself, should not necessarily negate the landowner's rights, but
certainly can factor into the balancing of interests.
Second, and more importantly, the Court's treatment in Lloyd
and Hudgens of the property owner's right to exclude showed
little sensitivity to the actual importance of that right for quasi-
public property." The right to exclude others from land is
most certainly a core value that has been accorded significant
protection in the law. In most circumstances, however, this
involves intrusions where the property is not open to the public
and expectations of privacy and autonomous control of the prop-
erty are high.' Such concerns are certainly diluted when
property is generally open to others. Since the concept of prop-
erty is a social construct, any property interest, including the
right to exclude, must necessarily be defined relative to compet-
ing social concerns."°° Indeed, in other contexts, such as laws
197. The Court has often stated that reasonable restrictions can be placed on First
Amendment exercise as long as adequate alternative opportunities for expression
exist. See, e.g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
812 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 654-55 (1981).
198. See Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 652-59 (1991) (arguing that when private property resembles
a marketplace, rather than a home, expectations of privacy and rationales for exclu-
sion are less).
199. For example, the Supreme Court's highly protective stance against even mini-
mal physical invasions in takings law has involved instances where the property was
not generally open to the public. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309
(1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
200. See Singer, supra note 159, at 1450. Professor Singer's article engages in an
in-depth examination of a property owner's right to exclude in providing public accom-
modations, most notably retail businesses. He notes that there is a "puzzling gap" in
public accommodations law in some states that would permit racial and gender dis-
crimination by retail stores. See id. at 1286-94. He then engages in an in-depth ex-
amination of the historical origins of public accommodations law. See id. at 1303-
1412. Even though the traditional common law rule limits the duty to serve to inn-
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prohibiting racial discrimination on property open to the public,
society has, in effect, redefined the scope of the right to ex-
clude."0' This certainly does not establish that people should
have access to shopping centers for speech, but it does indicate
that the issue is more debatable than the Court's reasoning in
Lloyd and Hudgens might suggest.
In a subsequent decision, however, Pruneyard Shopping Cen-
ter v. Robins, °20 the Court demonstrated some sensitivity to
how the quasi-public nature of property should affect the right
to exclude. There the Court held that private property interests,
though sufficient to preclude exercise of federal First Amend-
ment rights, were not so substantial so as to preclude exercise
of state free speech rights. In Pruneyard, several high school
students, who were prohibited from distributing pamphlets and
passing a petition in a privately owned shopping center,
brought suit to enjoin their denial 3 Although recognition of
any federal free speech rights was precluded by Lloyd and
Hudgens, the California Supreme Court held that its own state
Constitution protected reasonable speech and petitioning activi-
ties even in privately owned shopping centers and thus held for
the students.'" The shopping center in response argued that
recognition of a state free speech right requiring access to the
property constituted a Fifth Amendment taking of property and
would also violate the shopping center's own federal free speech
rights.
keepers and common carriers, Singer argues that a more plausible reading of early
cases was that all businesses open to the public had a duty to serve everyone and
could not exclude. See id. at 1298; 1321-31. He then uses this analysis to argue that
the common law right of access should be extended to all places open to the public.
See id. at 1443-49. Singer concludes his article with a discussion of "what public
accommodations law teaches us about the concept of property." Id. at 1450-77. He
forcefully argues that a landowner's right to exclude at common law was far from
absolute, at least as to property open to the public. In particular, he states "the his-
tory of public accommodations law suggests that the model of ownership built on the
privacy and autonomy interests of a homeowner may be an inappropriate paradigm
for conceptualizing the obligations and rights of owners of property open to the pub-
lic. It further suggests that all rights--even the basic right to exclude-are limited by
the rights of others and by social interests." Id. at 1450.
201. See id. at 1302 (noting that antidiscrimination laws belie the view that own-
ership of private property includes the absolute right to exclude others).
202. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
203. See id. at 77-78.
204. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979).
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The Supreme Court rejected both arguments. It acknowledged
that the right to exclude others is one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of property rights and that that stick had
been taken by the California Constitution. 5 It stated, howev-
er, that takings analysis requires consideration of several fac-
tors, including "the character of the governmental action, its
economic impact, and its interference with reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations.""°6 The Court concluded that there
was no taking under that analysis, since the speech activities
in question would neither impair the property's value or inter-
fere with its use as a shopping center."0 7 The Court also found
that there was no First Amendment violation, since the state
did not prescribe any particular message and there was little
likelihood, given the public nature of the center, that people
would identify speech activities with the center.0 8
The Court's rejection of the takings argument in Pruneyard
might seem surprising considering the importance normally
given the right to exclude. Although the Court has stated that
takings analysis requires examination of several factors,2" in-
cluding the interference with investment-backed expectations, it
has usually not considered the economic impact when a physi-
cal invasion is involved. Indeed, in several decisions since
Pruneyard the Court has held that any physical invasion, no
matter how minimal the economic impact, constitutes a tak-
ing. 10 This includes not only where the government itself in-
vades a person's property, but also where the government re-
quires that third parties be permitted onto the property.2 ' In
either instance, the state has interfered with the right to ex-
clude others, which the Court has consistently recognized as
lying at the center of property rights.2 Such an analysis ar-
205. See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82.
206. Id. at 83.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 87. Thus, unlike Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), where
the Court struck down a state required message on license plates, shopping centers
are not compelled to carry or identify with any particular message.
209. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1977).
210. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
211. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825 (required easement to allow public to walk across
property); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419 (law that required landlords to permit cable com-
panies to run cables on property).
212. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Lorretto, 458 U.S. at 433; Kaiser Aetna v.
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guably suggests a taking in Pruneyard, since the State of Cali-
fornia was forcing private property owners to permit speech
activities on their land.
The distinguishing factor in Pruneyard, however, would ap-
pear to be its quasi-public nature, where expectations of exclu-
sion are considerably less. In each of the cases where the Court
has found a physical occupation to be a taking, despite minimal
economic impact, the property was not generally open to the
public.2" Indeed, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.,"1 decided two years after Pruneyard, the Court held
that a New York law that required landlords to permit cable
access to tenants constituted a taking since it involved a physi-
cal invasion. It distinguished Pruneyard on the grounds that in
Pruneyard the invasion was not permanent and that "the owner
had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his
property."215
Despite Pruneyard, it is fair to say that the Court has gener-
ally recognized the right to exclude as sufficient to limit First
Amendment rights. As noted earlier, this is not surprising con-
sidering the often-perceived, near-absolute nature of that right
under common law and constitutional analysis.2"' Pruneyard
demonstrates, however, that the Court is partially sensitive to
the actual infringement of autonomy interests that might re-
sult, permitting state speech rights at least where the property
is quasi-public.
This sensitivity to the actual nature of the property interests
implicated has apparently continued in the years since
Pruneyard. During that time, the Court has given increased
recognition to property rights,217 including several cases in-
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
213. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (holding that a dedi-
cation requirement for private property constituted an uncompensated taking of the
private property); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825 (holding that a public easement across
residential property constituted a taking); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419 (holding that a
governmental requirement for cable installation in landlord's building constituted a
taking).
214. 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
215. Id. at 434.
216. But see Singer, supra note 159, at 1450 (suggesting common law right was
not as absolute as often perceived, at least with regard to property open to the pub-
lic).
217. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992);
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volving physical invasions by third persons.21 Yet the Court
has declined to reconsider its holding in Pruneyard and recently
denied certiorari in a case involving state recognition of speech
rights to shopping centers." This has left state courts to de-
cide if access is required.220 As such, the Court has apparently
chosen to stop short of where an uncritical acceptance of prop-
erty rights might have led.22'
B. Speech Interfering with Property
A second and more common conflict between speech and
property interests is where speech activity somehow interferes
with the use and enjoyment of property. A soundtruck blaring a
message in a residential neighborhood,2" signs and billboards
that pose an aesthetic blight to surrounding property," pick-
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
218. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Nollan v. California
Coastal Comu'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1983).
219. See New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty
Corp., 650 A-2d 757 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995).
220. The majority of state courts that have addressed the issue under their own
constitutions have followed the federal path, rejecting any free speech right in pri-
vately owned shopping centers. See Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm.,
767 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Cologne v. Westfarms Assoc., 469 A.2d 1201
(Conn. 1984); Citizens for Ethical Gov't v. Gwinnett Place Assoc., 392 S.E.2d 8 (Ga.
1990); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985); SHAD
Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Felmet, 273
S.E.2d 708 (N.C. 1981); Eastwood Mall v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994); Western
Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d
1331 (Pa. 1986); Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544 (S.C. 1992);
Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282
(Wash. 1989); Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987).
A few states, however, have recognized a state constitutional right to exercise
expression at privately owned malls. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592
P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aft'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819
P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Intl, 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Mass.
1983); New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 62 (1995); Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen,
849 P.2d 446, 453-54 (Or. 1993).
221. But see Dorsen & Gora, supra note 6, at 225-26 (stating that Pruneyard sim-
ply reflected deference to "the expansive power of the state to define, expand, or
contract property rights," not necessarily a yielding of property rights to speech
rights).
222. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948).
223. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789
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eting of a home,' 24 and door-to-door solicitation 22 are all ex-
amples of speech originating somewhere else, but which poten-
tially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land.
As might be expected, the Court implicitly balances the re-
spective speech and property interests in these situations. It
has recognized protection of the use and enjoyment of land,
especially residential property, as a substantial interest suffi-
cient to justify restrictions on speech. Conversely, property
owners, including homeowners, must tolerate some inconve-
nience and interference with property use.
This balancing of interests reflects both property and First
Amendment principles. Unlike the right to exclude, the right to
use and enjoyment of property is nowhere near absolute. Zoning
and nuisance law both recognize that conflicts between property
uses are inevitable and reasonable accommodations must be
made by landowners. Thus, nuisance law, which is designed to
promote protection of the use and enjoyment of property, never-
theless recognizes that some interference with property use is
reasonable and must be accepted by the landowner. 6 Only
unreasonable interferences, usually determined by balancing a
number of factors, are prohibited.'
Similarly, First Amendment jurisprudence has long engaged
in implicit balancing when reviewing time, place and manner
restrictions." As noted in Part One, speech activities cannot
be altogether banned from traditional public fora, but can be
made subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions
to avoid unnecessary interference with state interests." In
striking a reasonable balance, the Court generally considers the
availability of adequate alternatives, the importance of the state
interest, and the ability to further that interest in less restric-
(1984); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
224. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980).
225. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
226. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(b) (1979).
227. See id.
228. See generally, TRIBE, supra note 72, § 12-2, at 791; Stone, supra note 55, at
58.
229. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Heffron v. Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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tive ways." At bottom, this type of balancing is quite similar
to nuisance law balancing, in which reasonable interferences
with a person's property interests are permitted, and unrea-
sonable interferences prohibited.
Although First Amendment activities might interfere with
any type of property, the Court has most seriously addressed
them when they concern residential property. For this reason,
this article will first examine the Court's treatment of conflicts
between First Amendment exercise and residential privacy. It
will then examine First Amendment conflicts with other types
of property ownership.
1. Interferences With the Home
Conflicts between First Amendment exercise and residential
property interests often arise when people use public fora or
other traditional communicative media in residential
neighborhoods. Although streets and sidewalks do not lose their
special. First Amendment status in such situations, 1 the
Court has long recognized that residential interests, especially
privacy and autonomy concerns, can be protected from First
Amendment intrusion. In its earlier decisions, the Court recog-
nized the importance of such interests, but noted that the state
could further them in less restrictive ways. 2 In more recent
years, however, the Court has increasingly recognized residen-
tial privacy as an extremely important interest sufficient to
limit communication activities.'
One of the earliest cases to involve a First Amendment con-
flict with residential privacy was Martin v. City of Struthers2"
in which the Court reviewed an ordinance that prohibited door-
to-door residential distribution of handbills and advertise-
ments.' The city defended the ordinance on the grounds that
230. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984);
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
231. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988).
232. See Rowan v. United States Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1980); Kovacs v. Coo-
per, 330 U.S. 77 (1949); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
233. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980).
234. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
235. The ordinance in question stated:
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it served to protect householders from annoying intrusions and
interruptions of their privacy and rest. It argued that "constant
callers" may significantly intrude on residential enjoyment,
especially for those who work nights and sleep during the day.
The solicitation ban also helped prevent crime, since burglars
might pose as canvassers to spy on a house.
The Court rejected this argument, however, in essence saying
that less restrictive means existed for furthering the ordinance's
purposes.' It began by noting that even though door-to-door
distributors might be a nuisance in some instances, they also
may be "useful members of society" engaged in a longstanding
and highly important means of communication.' 7 Although
the Court did not dispute the importance of the residential
privacy concerns supporting the ordinance, it noted that the
problems could be addressed by letting each householder decide
whether to post signs prohibiting solicitation and canvass-
ing." It noted that a city could then validly punish those
who ignore such signs. 9 Such a scheme would protect the
rights of householders while still preserving essential First
Amendment freedoms.
The Court distinguished Martin six years later, however, in
Kovacs v. Cooper,' when it upheld as valid a municipal ordi-
nance which prohibited sound trucks on city streets that emit-
ted "loud and raucous noises.""4 Although only a year earlier
the Court had struck down an ordinance which gave a police
chief uncontrolled discretion in deciding to permit sound ampli-
fication, 2 no such defect existed in Kovacs.' Instead, the
It is unlawfil for any person distributing handbills, circulars or other
advertisements to ring the doorbell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise
summon the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the pur-
pose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other advertisements they or
any person with them may be distributing.
Id. at 142.
236. See id. at 145-49.
237. Id. at 145-46. In particular the Court emphasized that door-to-door canvassing
had played an important role for religious groups and in political campaigns, and
that it was "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people." Id. at 146.
238. See id. at 147-48.
239. See id. at 148.
240. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
241. Id. at 78.
242. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
243. It was argued that the term "loud and raucous" was too vague and obscure to
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Court focused on the captive audience problem posed by sound
trucks, noting that listeners are unable to escape their intrusive
effect.2" Unlike Martin, where householders could themselves
take measures to stop unwanted messages, citizens are "practi-
cally helpless to escape this interference with... privacy by
loud speakers." m
The right of homeowners to be free from unwanted communi-
cation, suggested in Martin and clearly recognized in Kovacs,
was affirmed two decades later in Rowan v. United States Post
Office.' There, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
federal statute under which a person could require that a mail-
er remove the person's name from mailing lists and stop send-
ing future mail to the person.21 Various publishers, distribu-
tors and operators of mailing services challenged the statute as
violating their First Amendment rights, since it prohibited
those groups from communicating with certain people.' In
upholding the statute, the Court acknowledged it had the effect
of "impeding the flow of ideas, information, and arguments,"
but found it a reasonable measure to protect residential privacy
interests from unwanted communication. 9
In recognizing residential privacy concerns as sufficient to
limit First Amendment expression, the Court noted that "the
ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' . . . has lost
be enforceable. While recognizing that the words were abstract, the Court held that
through daily use the words had acquired a content that conveys a "sufficiently accu-
rate concept of what is forbidden." Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 79.
244. See id. at 86-87.
245. Id. The Court's analysis in Kovacs was not limited to invasions of residential
privacy, but also included captive audiences anywhere the message might carry, in-
cluding streets and office buildings. See id. at 87, 89. Yet in several places the Court
expressed particular concern for residential privacy interests that might be invaded by
"loud and raucous" loud speakers. For example, the Court noted that in the absence
of such an ordinance, "In the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tranquility so
desirable for city dwellers would likewise be at the mercy of advocates of particular
religious, social or political persuasions." Id& at 87. Similarly, the Court concluded by
stating the ordinance was justified by "the need for reasonable protection in the hous-
es or business houses from the distracting noises of vehicles equipped with such
sound amplifying equipment." Id. at 89.
246. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
247. See id. at 729-30.
248. See id. at 735-36.
249. Id. at 736-37.
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none of it's vitality.""0 This includes the "basic right to be
free from sights [and] sounds... we do not want." 1 Thus, in
striking a balance between speech and privacy rights, the Court
stated that a "right to communicate must stop at the mailbox of
an unreceptive addressee." 2 Further, the decision to withhold
communication was given to the resident, making it consistent
with the Court's suggestion in Martin that households could
decide for themselves to prohibit solicitation. 3 Thus, the stat-
ute was no broader than necessary to address the core concern
of avoiding intrusions of unwanted communication into residen-
tial privacy.
Read together, Martin, Kovacs and Rowan clearly establish
residential privacy as a substantial government interest suffi-
cient to restrain First Amendment activities. In doing so, they
recognize that the inner confines of a residence should be a
sanctuary from outside interferences, including unwanted First
Amendment intrusions. Yet the Court was quite cognizant of
First Amendment concerns, including the need to preserve tra-
ditional means of expression necessary for effective communica-
tion. Thus, where less effective means of ensuring privacy exist-
ed, such as the use of "no solicitation" signs in Martin, the
Court was quick to strike the restriction down.
Moreover, the Court's primary concern in these cases was to
protect residential privacy within the inner confines of the
home. This is not to say that there might not be other impor-
tant interests in preserving more general residential amenities,
such as quiet streets and aesthetically pleasing surround-
ings.' But such "neighborhood" interests are arguably less
compelling than the "privacy" interests emphasized in Martin,
Kovacs, and Rowan. In particular, there was no suggestion in
those decisions that streets, parks, and sidewalks lost their
First Amendment significance because of their proximity to
homes. Instead, the Court seemed to say that the reach of
250. Id. at 737 (citations omitted).
251. Id. at 736.
252. Id. at 736-37.
253. See id. at 736; cf. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
254. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) ("a quiet place
where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guide-
lines" in zoning).
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speech originating in such places or through such means must
stop at a householder's door.
The Court's solicitude for residential privacy was again rein-
forced and arguably expanded in two recent decisions concern-
ing residential picketing." In the first decision, Carey v.
Brown,56 the Court reviewed an Illinois statute which prohib-
ited residential picketing, but exempted "peaceful picketing of
place of employment involved in a labor dispute."257 Although
the Court struck down the ordinance because it was content-
based, 8 in dictum it affirmed the statute's important purpose
of preserving residential privacy. In a strong endorsement of
residential values, the Court stated:
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to
which men and women can repair to escape from the tribu-
lations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important value.
Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an
individual "to be let alone" in the privacy of the home,
"sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the
sick." . . . The State's interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the
highest order in a free and civilized society."
The Court revisited the issue of residential picketing eight
years later, in Frisby v. Schultz,26° in what is arguably its
most far-reaching protection of residential property interests
against First Amendment exercise to date. In that case, a
number of people opposed to abortion had picketed on a public
street outside the home of a doctor who performed
abortions. 6' In response, the town council passed an ordi-
nance which completely prohibited all picketing "before or
about" any residence.262  The protestors discontinued their
255. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980).
256. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
257. Id. at 457.
258. See id. at 461-62.
259. Id. at 471 (citations omitted).
260. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
261. See id. at 476.
262. See id. at 476-77.
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picketing, but filed suit challenging the ordinance on First
Amendment grounds.2"
The Court began its analysis by first determining whether
the residential streets in question constituted a traditional
public forum requiring some accommodation of First
Amendment rights.2" The city argued that the streets in
question were not traditional fora because they were physically
narrow and located in residential neighborhoods, and thus nev-
er dedicated to public communication.2 The Court rejected
this argument, however, strongly stating that "a public street
does not lose its status as a traditional public forum simply
because it runs through a residential neighborhood."266 Thus,
some accommodation must be made for First Amendment activ-
ities such as picketing.
The Court then proceeded to narrowly construe the ordinance
as only prohibiting "picketing focused on, and taking place in
front of, a particular residence," 7 rather than banning all
picketing in residential areas, which would clearly be invalid.
Thus narrowed, the Court found the restriction reasonable."
First, it noted that by prohibiting only picketing focused on a
single home, the ordinance provided ample alternative means of
expression."'
Second, and more importantly, the Court held that the resi-
dential privacy interests were sufficiently substantial to justify
the First Amendment restriction. It began by quoting from
Carey and reiterating that the state's interest in protecting the
tranquility of the home is "of the highest order" and that "pre-
serving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men
and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their
daily pursuits, is surely an important value."'27
263. See id. at 477.
264. See id. at 479-80.
265. See id. at 480.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 482.
268. See id. at 483.
269. See id. at 483-84.
270. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
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The Court then focused on the primary aspect of residential
privacy presented in the case--"protection of the unwilling lis-
tener."271 Although outside the home people are often expected
to avoid unwanted speech, the Court stated that the home was
different, where within its walls citizens should be free from
unwanted intrusions.272 Thus, it noted that the Court had fre-
quently held that the state could protect against unwanted
intrusions, such as offensive radio broadcasts,273  offensive
mailings,274 and excessive noise from sound trucks.2 5
It then held that the ordinance, as narrowly interpreted, was
designed to serve such a purpose. As interpreted by the Court,
the ordinance did not ban picketing aimed at the general pub-
lic, but only picketing targeted at a particular residence, which
it stated could have a "devastating effect" on the quiet enjoy-
ment of the home.276 In particular, the Court noted that "the
tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical," but
they still intrude on residential privacy and tranquility." In-
deed, the Court stated that "even a solitary picket can invade
residential privacy,"27 noting that "there are few of us that
would feel comfortable knowing that a stranger lurks outside
our home."7 Thus, the Court suggested that a complete ban
on picketing targeted at a home, even when it involved only a
single, quiet picketer, would be valid.
Although the Court in Frisby attempted to ground its holding
in earlier Court cases protecting residential privacy, it clearly
expanded the type of residential interests that could be protect-
ed. As suggested by Justice Brennan's dissent,2" the type of
residential interests protected in prior decisions involved actual
intrusions into the home-an unwelcome solicitor," unwanted
271. Id.
272. See id. at 484-85.
273. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
274. See Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
275. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
276. See Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988).
277. Id. at 486 (citations omitted).
278. Id. at 487 (citations omitted).
279. Id. at 487 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478-79 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).
280. See id. at 491-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
281. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
[Vol. 31:1
PROPERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
mail,' excessive noise,' or radio messages." In some
real sense, these gained entry into the home itself. Although
targeted residential picketing might at times be similarly intru-
sive, depending on the level of noise, hours of protest, and
number of picketers, such problems can be addressed by a more
narrowly drawn ordinance that regulates each of the above
concerns.2 f The Court indicated, however, that any targeted
residential picketing, no matter how limited in scope, could be
prohibited.'
Therefore, it appears that the type of residential privacy
interests protected in Frisby clearly extend beyond the intrusive
and coercive activities previously justifying First Amendment
restrictions. Rather, the Court elevated the home to a sanctuary
from even the psychological effects of speech taking place en-
tirely outside the home. Although grounded in the Court's rec-
ognition that the state can protect residential privacy and tran-
quility, it seemed to shift the balance between speech and resi-
dential property interests even more toward the latter. As such,
the autonomy and privacy concerns associated with a residence
become an even more dominant factor when weighed against
speech interests.
2. Non-Residential Property
Whereas the Court has clearly addressed the potential con-
flict between residential values and First Amendment exercise,
it has had less occasion to examine speech conflicts with non-
residential property. Certainly some of the same considerations
are relevant here, since the owner of nonresidential property
282. See Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970Y.
283. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
284. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
285. See Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474, 493-95 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that less restrictive means of regulation existed). The Court has frequently
stated that a First Amendment restriction will be invalid even if it furthers impor-
tant interests if those interests could be equally well served by a more narrowly
drawn restriction that imposes less of a burden on the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48
(1981).
286. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487-88.
1997]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
also has a right to be free from unreasonable interference with
use and enjoyment of the land, even when caused by First
Amendment exercise. Thus, the Court in Kovacs, though em-
phasizing the interference sound trucks would cause to resi-
dential privacy, also noted that businesses and other property
uses would have a right to be free from such intrusions.'
Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that the strength of the prop-
erty interests are generally not as strong as residential inter-
ests. In particular, the autonomy and privacy concerns, so
strongly emphasized in the residential cases, are certainly less
significant when speech interferes with nonresidential property.
Perhaps the primary example of where nonresidential proper-
ty interests2" might be seen as restricting speech is with zon-
ing of certain First Amendment activities. Although zoning deci-
sions often reflect a multitude of concerns, it is fair to say that
minimizing interferences with surrounding property often is a
central purpose.' A decision to prohibit or limit a particular
land use in a certain location is at least in part justified be-
cause of its potential interference with the use and enjoyment
of surrounding property. Thus, zoning restrictions on First
Amendment exercise, such as sign or billboard regulations or
restrictions on the location of adult theaters or churches, can be
viewed at least in part as limiting expressive activity in order
to protect surrounding property interests.
As a practical matter, however, the Court has not exclusively
emphasized property interests as such in examining the validity
of zoning restrictions on First Amendment land uses. Rather, it
has more generally applied a time, place and manner analysis
to such restrictions, essentially balancing the impact on speech
against the importance of asserted state interests.2" Unlike
287. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87, 89.
288. Zoning restrictions obviously also protect residential property interests. The
residential property interests protected by zoning, however, are usually not the auton-
omy and privacy concerns reflected in decisions such as Frisby, but instead more
"neighborhood" amenities like traffic and noise. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (emphasizing quiet streets, reduced traffic, and few peo-
ple).
289. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926)
(elimination of noise and traffic from residential districts valid basis for zoning); see
generally DANIEL MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.3 (1982).
290. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986);
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intrusions into residential autonomy and privacy, where the
Court has been quite solicitous of property-related values, the
Court has more clearly sought to balance the respective inter-
ests when nonresidential property is involved. Thus, the Court
has indicated that state interests behind zoning, which often
concern minimizing interferences with neighborhoods and sur-
rounding property, are sufficient to justify restrictions on
speech, as long as there is no suppressive effect.2"' However,
where the impact on speech is significant, or where the state
fails to establish a significant interest, the restriction must
fail.292
It might be argued, however, that recent Supreme Court
decisions upholding restrictions on adult uses reflect a prefer-
ence for property interests over First Amendment concerns.9
This is particularly true of City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres,' where the Court held that a city could restrict
adult theaters to 5% of a town's area, even though there were
few properties in that area actually available for use.2 5
Among the asserted state interests were several that concerned
protection of property, including preserving property values and
"preserving and protecting the quality of the city's neighbor-
hoods."29 The Court held that these interests were sufficient
to justify what would appear to be a quite significant limitation
on speech.
To some extent, Renton might therefore be further evidence
of the Court's increasing willingness to let property interests
limit speech, especially since property related interests played
an important role in upholding the restrictions. It should be
noted, however, that the asserted state interests also included
more general rationales, such as crime prevention and
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1981); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 & n.18 (1976).
291. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54.
292. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 72.
293. See Dorsen & Gora, supra note 6, at 234-35 (suggesting that the Court's deci-
sion in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), upholding a zon-
ing restriction on adult uses, demonstrated the Burger Court's willingness to protect
private property interests at the expense of First Amendment interests).
294. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
295. See id. at 53-54.
296. Id. at 48 (alterations in original).
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"preserv[ing] the quality of urban life."297 Moreover, though
pornography is protected First Amendment speech, there is an
undertone in the Court's cases in this area that suggest some
lower status. 8 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Renton does
demonstrate that zoning might be used to limit First Amend-
ment exercise to preserve property interests.
Generally speaking, using zoning to preserve surrounding
property values and enjoyment by limiting speech such as adult
theaters is quite appropriate. In such situations, the location of
primary land uses is essentially fungible, since there is no spe-
cial relationship to any particular site and thus, requiring that
speech occur in some other location is rarely inherently sup-
pressive. Conversely, the interference with surrounding proper-
ty, resulting in reduced property values and diminished use and
enjoyment, can be substantial and less easily avoided. Assum-
ing that adequate alternative sites are available for the First
Amendment use, such zoning restrictions would appear to be an
appropriate balancing of the respective concerns since speech is
not significantly affected. Where speech opportunities are signif-
icantly suppressed, however, which might have been the case in
Renton, a more sensitive balancing of interests should occur.
III. SPEECH ENHANCED BY PROPERTY
A third and final way in which property interests might
affect First Amendment analysis is that property rights might
enhance First Amendment exercise. On one level, of course,
private property interests enhance expression in a number of
obvious ways. Those with property and wealth are able to com-
municate more effectively simply by greater access to a wide
variety of media. Television, radio and print media all cost
money, and those with significant financial resources can obvi-
ously use those media with greater efficacy than the average
citizen. Although the Court has been sensitive to ensuring that
inexpensive media and traditional public fora remain available
297. Id. at 50 (quoting American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 71).
298. See id. at 49 n.2 (noting that the plurality opinion in American Mini
Theatres, stated "(I]t is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of ex-
pression is of a wholly different, and lesser magnitude than the interest in untram-
meled political debate .... ").
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for expression,2" all this does is guarantee the availability of
some minimum means of expression; it certainly does not create
a level First Amendment playing field. The Court has generally
permitted such a disparity to continue, rejecting in most in-
stances attempts to limit a person's greater First Amendment
abilities generated by wealth."e°
Similarly, a person's speech rights can be enhanced by own-
ership of real property. Unlike the public forum, where access
for First Amendment exercise is based on dedicated use, an
owner can decide to dedicate private property to any First
Amendment use within reason. Thus, the property can be used
for religious meetings, speeches, political coffees, political gath-
erings, protests, or informational activities. As noted earlier, the
state needs a substantial interest to regulate speech, which
usually concerns the secondary effects of the activity. Where
speech is exercised on private property, such secondary effects
might not come into play.
At times, of course, speech originating from private property
can conflict with broader state interests. The Court has made
clear that the fact that the speech occurs on private property
does not insulate it from regulation.3"' Zoning of First Amend-
ment activities is the most obvious example, with both the
Supreme Court and lower courts consistently holding that
zoning ordinances may prohibit some First Amendment activi-
ties on certain properties."°s Similarly, no one would seriously
dispute that the state can regulate the level of noise, even of
299. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 310 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (door-to-door
canvassing "essential to the poorly financed causes of little people"); Schneider v. New
Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939).
300. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curium) (invalidating expen-
diture limitations of 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act); see also Dorsen & Gora,
supra note 6, at 209-12 (discussing Court's rejection of "effort[s] to equalize" public
debate).
301. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 41 (1986)
(adult theaters subject to zoning restrictions); Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981) (signs and billboards on private property can be subject to regula-
tion).
302. See, e.g., Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 41 (zoning ordinance can limit
adult uses to small area of town); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 490 (signs and billboards
on private property can be subject to zoning restrictions); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (zoning can restrict First Amendment activities, but is
subject to heightened scrutiny).
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political speech, emanating from a house despite private owner-
ship. 303
The conflict in such cases is clear. Although the speech might
originate from private property, it extends into the broader
community and potentially interferes with significant state
interests. Assuming content-neutrality, the Court will resolve
such a conflict by weighing the significance of the state's in-
terest and the availability of First Amendment alternatives. In
many instances, the asserted state interest will in fact be the
protection of surrounding property interests of neighbors. Thus,
assuming adequate alternatives exist for the expression, the
Court might well choose to regulate speech originating from
private property in order to protect the property interests of
surrounding neighbors.3
The Court has indicated on several occasions, however, that
speech interests can be enhanced by their association with
property rights, even where they conflict with state interests
that would normally justify regulation. In other words, even
where substantial state interests exist that would otherwise
justify regulation, the association with property interests shifts
the balance in favor of speech interests. In such situations, the
association with property interests is a factor, perhaps even the
deciding factor, in preserving First Amendment exercise. Of
course, it is not the property per se that justifies the greater
protection, but values attendant to property, such as privacy
and autonomy concerns. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that
property-related values might enhance speech interests vis-a-
vis competing government interests.
An early and significant recognition of the way in which
property interests can enhance speech interests came in Stanley
v. Georgia.?0 5 In that case, police officers searched a home for
evidence of bookmaking activity. Although no evidence of book-
making was found, in the course of the search obscene films
303. Cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (can regulate "loud and raucous"
sound trucks on public streets).
304. Although zoning serves various purposes, its primary objective is usually con-
sidered to be minimizing conflicting land uses and thus preserving the use and enjoy-
ment of land and respective economic values.
305. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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were discovered. The person was arrested and later convicted
under a Georgia statute that prohibited knowing possession of
obscene matter.3"
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions,
holding that possession of obscene material in the privacy of
the home was constitutionally protected. 7 Although the Court
acknowledged that the First Amendment "recognize[s] a valid
governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity,"
that interest does not mean that all other constitutional
protections are lost.3" Particularly significant to the Court's
holding was that the obscene materials were found in the priva-
cy of a person's home, where the First Amendment right to
receive information and ideas take on added significance.3"
Thus, the Court stated that:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regu-
lating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the priva-
cy of one's own home. If the First Amendment means any-
thing, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or
what films he may watch."1
Stanley thus held that residential privacy concerns can en-
hance speech rights by protecting First Amendment activity
that would otherwise be subject to regulation. Indeed, in a more
recent decision, Bowers v. Hardwick,31' the Court expressly
interpreted Stanley in such a fashion, stating "Stanley did pro-
tect conduct that would not have been protected outside the
home."3" At the same time, Hardwick noted that Stanley was
not a mere privacy decision protecting any conduct in the priva-
cy of the home; rather, it said Stanley "was firmly grounded in
the First Amendment."" On that basis, the Court in
Hardwick refused to recognize a constitutional right to engage
306. See id. at 558-59.
307. See id. at 559, 565.
308. See id. at 563.
309. See id. at 564.
310. Id. at 565.
311. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
312. Id. at 195.
313. Id.
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in homosexual conduct in the privacy of the home.314 Thus,
the Hardwick Court seemed to clearly interpret Stanley as
recognizing residential privacy rights as being particularly rele-
vant when associated with First Amendment interests.
Five years after Stanley the Court again recognized in Spence
v. Washington," that speech rights might be enhanced by
property interests. In that case a college student hung an
American flag upside down from his apartment window, with a
peace symbol attached to the flag. He was charged with and
subsequently convicted of a statute prohibiting "improper use"
of the flag, which prohibited inter alia placing or attaching
designs on a flag.31
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on First Amend-
ment grounds. 1 In doing so, it began by noting that several
factors were important in deciding the case, among them that
the flag was privately owned and that the flag was displayed
on private property." Later in the decision the Court reem-
phasized the fact that the flag was displayed on private proper-
ty, stating:
We are confronted [here] with a case of prosecution for the
expression of an idea through activity. Moreover, the activi-
ty occurred on private property, rather than in an environ-
ment over which the State by necessity must have certain
supervisory powers unrelated to expression. Accordingly, we
must examine with particular care the interests advanced
by appellee to support its prosecution.319
Having established this need for a more rigorous review, the
Court proceeded to reject each of the asserted state inter-
ests.320
314. See id. at 195-96.
315. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
316. See id. at 406-07.
317. See id. at 415.
318. See id. at 408-09.
319. Id. at 411 (citations omitted).
320. The Court rejected each of the following possible state interests: breach of the
peace; protecting the sensibilities of passersby; failure to show proper respect for our
national emblem; and the state of Washington's interest in preserving the national
flag as an "unalloyed symbol of our country." See id. at 412-15.
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Admittedly, the recognition of private property interests was
not dispositive in Spence. Arguably, the Court would have
reached the same result even if the flag had not been displayed
from private property, but was instead displayed in an appro-
priate manner in a traditional public fora. Moreover, the
Court's rationale for more closely reviewing First Amendment
restraints when applied to private property was rather modest.
Although it is true that the state lacks a supervisory interest in
the same way it does when speech takes place on public proper-
ty, there still might be state interests sufficient to justify rea-
sonable restrictions. Nevertheless, the Court clearly indicated
that whether speech was exercised on public or private property
was at least a factor in analyzing the validity of restrictions.
The Court's most recent and clearest recognition of how pri-
vate property rights enhance speech rights came in City of
Ladue v. Gilleo."2' In Ladue the Court reviewed an ordinance
which prohibited all residential signs with a few limited excep-
tions."2 The ordinance was challenged by a citizen who was
told that a lawn sign and later, a small window sign protesting
the war in the Persian Gulf were prohibited. 3 The Supreme
Court held the prohibition on residential signs unconstitutional,
stating it involved a unique and venerable means of communi-
cation which could not be entirely foreclosed.3"
In finding the restriction unconstitutional, the Court stated
that the ordinance restricted "too much" speech by foreclosing a
venerable and a uniquely important means of communica-
tion."2 Although the Court suggested that residential signs
constituted a distinct medium of communication and therefore,
could not be altogether banned,326 it primarily focused on the
321. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
322. The ordinance exempted "residence identification' signs, "for sale" signs, and
safety hazard signs, and also permitted churches and several other organizations to
display signs not permitted by homeowners. See id. at 2040..
323. See id.
324. See id. at 2045.
325. The Court began its analysis by noting that a sign restriction might be infirm
either because it restricted "too little" speech by violating content-neutrality concerns
or by restricting "too much" speech by affecting a uniquely important means of com-
munication. See id. at 2043. Although the content exemptions in the ordinance argu-
ably violated content-neutrality, the Court instead chose to invalidate the ordinance
because it restricted "too much" speech.
326. See id. at 2046. The Court noted that it had previously held that bans on
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uniquely important role that residential signs played in effec-
tive communication. In this regard, the Court first noted that
residential signs are unique because their location provides
information about the identity of the speaker, which is a criti-
cal component in evaluating a message. 27 Further, residential
signs are a convenient and inexpensive form of communication,
which for people of modest means has no practical alterna-
tive." Thus, residential signs offer a special utility not easily
replicated by alternative media.
The Court then proceeded to emphasize in more specific
terms the special role played by the home in the exercise of
First Amendment rights, stating:
A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long
been part of our culture and our law; that principle has
special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a
person's ability to speak there. Most Americans would be
understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that
it was illegal to display from their window an 8 - by -11
inch sign expressing their political views. Whereas the
government's need to mediate among various competing
uses, including expressive ones, for public streets and facili-
ties is constant and unavoidable, its need to regulate tem-
perate speech from the home is surely much less
pressing.3
2 9
The Court also thought it significant that homeowners have a
strong incentive to maintain property values and avoid visual
clutter on their property-incentives that don't exist when plac-
ing signs on the property of others."' Although this self-polic-
ing by private property owners does not make a medium
uniquely valuable, the Court seemed to treat it as a factor in
assessing the strength of the state's interest when deciding
whether an ordinance restricts "too much7 speech.
entire media of communication, such as handbill distribution, door-to-door solicitation,
and live entertainment had been invalid.
327. See id. at 2047.
328. See id.
329. Id. (citations omitted).
330. See id.
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Ladue is the Court's clearest statement yet of the constitu-
tional significance of the home as a First Amendment forum
and how it might enhance speech rights. In noting its signifi-
cance the Court suggested several different reasons why speech
interests might deserve special protection when associated with
the home. First are functional concerns which reflect the home's
unique characteristics for expression. Signs are cheap and con-
venient, and provide information regarding the speaker's identi-
ty, an important component in communication. Although such
functional concerns are not controlling, the Court has frequently
focused on them in balancing speech interests against state
interests. Because the home offers advantages not easily inter-
changeable with other media, the balance might easily shift to
the speaker.
Second, the Court suggested that while speech interests are
enhanced in the home, competing government interests are
generally less pressing. Both Spence and Ladue alluded to the
fact that the government does not need to "mediate among
various competing uses,""' with regard to public property.
Similarly, the Court in Ladue suggested that the state's inter-
est is further dissipated by the self-regulating nature of home
ownership.3
3 2
The final, and perhaps most significant rationale supporting
the exercise of First Amendment rights in the home is tradition
and its relationship to autonomy and self-fulfillment. As noted
earlier, tradition has long been an important factor in deter-
mining access to public fora. In a similar way, the Court sug-
gested that the longstanding association of the home with ex-
pressive activities not only testifies to its utility, but creates
strong expectations on the part of citizens. The Court in Ladue
noted that "a special respect for individual liberty in the home
has long been a part of our culture and our law,"' and stat-
ed that people would be "dismayed" to learn that they could not
display a sign from their windows.'
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ably reflects more fundamental values concerning human auton-
omy and self-fulfillment. Although certainly not immune from
regulation, the home is the most logical locale for self-expres-
sion and liberty. Whereas in the public arena social convention
necessitates compromise, in the home the individual is su-
preme. The home plays a central role in ensuring a place where
a person is free to pursue self-expression and fulfillment.
These same concerns about autonomy and self-fulfillment
have often been noted by First Amendment theorists as central
values. Although articulating the standard differently, a number
of writers have suggested that the First Amendment primarily
serves to maximize self-expression and development. 5 Central
to such thinking is that the First Amendment provides a realm
where identity of self can be discovered, explored and developed
free from state control.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the home should have
special significance when analyzing First Amendment rights.
Interests in autonomy and self-fulfillment, central to First
Amendment jurisprudence, are quite logically pursued there.
The home provides an arena where self-expression can be pur-
sued most clearly and where respect for such values is stron-
gest. 36 Thus, in the Court's words, there should be a "special
resonance" for speech in the home.3 7
Stanley, Spence, and Ladue all involved expression associated
with the home, where the speech enhancing values of property
would appear to be strongest. Although the Court has not clear-
ly articulated a similar First Amendment value for nonresiden-
tial property, in at least one relatively recent decision, City
Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent," the Court
335. See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7
(1970) (identifying four values supporting freedom of speech, the first being "assuring
individual self-fulfillment"); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS 9-39 (1984) (suggesting free speech guarantee "serves only one true value,"
that being "individual self-realization"); see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-91 (1978) (accepting
Emerson's four values, and noting that the self-flfillment value "requires ... a
realm of liberty for self-determined processes of self-realization").
336. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 56 (1993) ("the home
is a moral nexus between liberty, privacy and freedom of association").
337. See Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2047.
338. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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suggested a similar interest for even nonresidential property. In
that case, the Court reviewed a Los Angeles ordinance which
prohibited the posting of any sign on public property. The as-
serted interests behind the regulation were traffic safety and
aesthetics-the "elimination of visual clutter." 9 The ordinance
was challenged by Taxpayers for Vincent, a group which at-
tached cardboard political signs to public utility poles. The
Supreme Court upheld the ordinance as a valid time, place, and
manner restriction on speech, finding that it furthered a sub-
stantial state interest, was no broader than necessary, and left
ample alternatives for expression.'
Although the Court focused its analysis on the ordinance's
general validity as a time, place, and manner restriction, it did
suggest as part of its analysis a special deference to the use of
private property for exercising speech. The court of appeals had
held that the ordinance could not be justified on aesthetic
grounds, since it was underinclusive by not prohibiting signs on
private property despite their equally unattractive nature."'
The Supreme Court did not contest that signs on private prop-
erty are equally unattractive, but rejected the under-inclusive-
ness argument, stating that "[t]he private citizen's interest in
controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate
treatment." 2 This ruling, while not definitive, does indicate
that the Court is willing to recognize some significance to even
nonresidential private property for speech purposes,' at least
where the speech is ancillary to another primary use. This is
arguably justified by the fact that even the owner of non-resi-
339. Id. at 823.
340. See id. at 805-12.
341. See id. at 810.
342. Id. at 811.
343. The Court also drew a distinction between restrictions on public and private
property in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). There it re-
viewed an injunction which, inter alia, prohibited demonstrations within 36 feet of an
abortion clinic. The Court upheld the restrictions as applied to public property, but
found them invalid as applied to private property. It did so, however, on the basis
that there had been no evidence that demonstrations on private property interfered
with entrance to the abortion clinic. See Ladue, 114 S. Ct. at 252. Thus, where in
Vincent the Court acknowledged comparable harms between the speech on private
and public property, but drew a distinction based on the special significance of pri-
vate property, in Madsen it drew the distinction based on the distinct harms between
exercise on private and public property. Nevertheless, Madsen might subtly support
some deference to speech on private property.
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dential property has some autonomy interest in the property,
though obviously not nearly to the same extent as the owner of
a home.
In contrast to Ladue and Vincent, both of which involved
speech ancillary to property ownership, the Court has made
clear that government may place zoning restrictions on various
First Amendment activities, such as religious' and adult us-
es,' despite the fact that the activity is to occur on private
property. The Court has generally reviewed such restrictions
subject to a time, place and manner standard, and, assuming
that adequate alternatives were permitted, has upheld
them.' As a practical matter, the fact that the activity was
to occur on private property was of no consequence in the
Court's deliberations.
There are two rationales for essentially ignoring the property
interests of the restricted landowner in such situations. First,
as discussed in the previous section, zoning restrictions are
often designed to protect the private property interests of sur-
rounding neighbors, which would be in conflict with those of
the restricted property.' Thus, property interests are on both
sides of the zoning equation, and the neighbor's right to be free
from interference outweighs the restricted owner's right to set-
tle in any particular location if adequate locations are available
elsewhere.
Second, and more significantly, the property interests in
Ladue, and to a lesser extent Vincent, enhanced speech because
344. The Supreme Court has not itself decided a case involving a zoning restriction
on churches. In recent years, lower courts have generally upheld such restrictions,
however, usually applying the equivalent of a time, place, and manner analysis. The
Supreme Court has declined to review the decisions. See, e.g., Lakewood, Oh. Con-
gregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983). Assuming adequate alternative sites are available,
the Supreme Court's time, place, and manner analysis strongly suggests that certain
locational restrictions on churches, such as their exclusion from residential neighbor-
hoods, would be valid. For discussions of church zoning issues, see Mark W. Cordes,
Where to Pray? Religious Zoning and the First Amendment, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 697
(1987), and Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First
Amendment, 64 B.U.L. REV. 767 (1984).
345. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
346. See, e.g., Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 47.
347. See id. at 48; see generally MANDELKER, supra note 289, at 4.
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of the property's unique connection to the speech in question,
which could not be duplicated if exercised elsewhere. In
contrast, the property interests involved in typical zoning deci-
sions are more fungible in nature, since they simply involve the
location of a primary land use activity. Although there might be
some advantages to locating a church or adult theater in one
place or another, there is generally no uniquely important
connection to the land itself. Rather, location is an allocative
decision designed to minimize conflicting land uses. Unlike
speech ancillary to some other primary use, such as a home,
the zoning of speech activities which constitute the primary use
of the land would not concern speech uniquely connected to the
land. It makes sense, therefore, for the Court essentially to
ignore any private property interest on the part of the regulat-
ed landowner.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article began by suggesting that in recent years the
Supreme Court has given increasing deference to property inter-
ests in First Amendment analysis, and that would appear to be
true. Although the Court has long recognized property interests
in First Amendment analysis,' it has arguably increased in
recent years. This can be seen in a number of decisions, includ-
ing further retrenching of the public forum doctrine in Kokinda
and Lee, limiting the scope of residential picketing in Frisby,
upholding severe restrictions on adult uses in Renton, and en-
hancing speech rights in Ladue.
To some extent, these decisions might simply reflect the
Court's growing recognition of property rights in general. In-
deed, it is fair to say that some of the same considerations that
guide the Court's takings jurisprudence would also lead to a
greater deference to property interests in First Amendment
analysis. Thus, the Court's sensitivity to physical invasions in
takings might also help explain its reluctance to revisit Lloyd
and even its deference to state control in the public forum. On
a more general level, the Court's declarations that property
348. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949).
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rights are not a "poor relation" to other constitutional safe-
guards 9  certainly sets a tone that might influence the
Court's thinking when property interests intersect with those
other constitutional safeguards.
It would be a mistake, however, to simply assume that the
Court is developing a kneejerk reaction toward property inter-
ests in its First Amendment jurisprudence. Although at times
property interests are given significant weight, attention to
property related values is by no means dispositive in all in-
stances. Rather, it might be one of several factors involved in a
case, and its significance turns on the nature of both the prop-
erty interest involved as well as the impact on speech opportu-
nities. In particular, not all property interests are equal and, at
least with regard to private property, the more central or core
the nature of the property interest, the more likely it will im-
pact speech analysis, either by being a reason to restrict speech
or enhance speech.
In this regard, there are several clear observations. First, a
private property owner's right to exclude limits most First
Amendment activity. This is not surprising considering the
important nature of the interest, which touches upon both au-
tonomy and privacy concerns. Thus, the Court has made clear
that the right to exclude is sufficient to limit the exercise of
federal free speech rights under almost all circumstances.'
Even here, however, the Court has indicated that the actual
nature of the property interests might be assessed in particular
cases, and where private property has been generally made
open to the public it will permit state recognition of speech
rights."' Although one might well disagree with how the
Court has struck the balance on this issue,"2 it seems appar-
ent that the Court has not pushed the right to exclude to the
potential extent suggested by its takings jurisprudence.
A second and equally clear factor to emerge from the private
349. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2320 (1994).
350. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567-70 (1972).
351. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
352. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text; see also Berger, supra note
198, at 633 (arguing that court has given too much weight to property interests over
speech concerns in the shopping center cases).
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property cases is the important role of the home as influencing
First Amendment analysis. Although respect for residential
privacy goes as far back as Martin v. City of Struthers," the
last several decades have seen increased recognition of the
home as a constitutionally significant locale in two respects. On
the one hand, the Court has viewed the home as a sanctuary
from First Amendment intrusions, justifying restrictions on
various First Amendment activities that would otherwise in-
trude on privacy and autonomy. On the other hand, the Court
in Stanley, Spence and Ladue recognized the unique nature of
the home for speech purposes. Indeed, the two lines of cases
come together in this regard-that the home serves as a con-
nection to a person's development and autonomy, providing it
with a unique status for expression and privacy.
This special solicitude for the home in First Amendment
analysis is easy to understand. As noted in the previous sec-
tion, the home is the most logical locale for recognizing individ-
ual autonomy and self-expression, both important First Amend-
ment values. More than that, the home is society's agreed upon
place where one can be free from outside interferences."M It is
here that a person is most able to define him or herself free
from societal and state coercion. Thus, insulating the home
from outside intrusions helps to promote the autonomy and
self-realization values inherent in the First Amendment itself.
Similarly, the self-realization dimension of the First Amend-
ment arguably is most meaningful where it can be exercised in
a setting closely aligned with a person's identity.
An additional reason for the home's special First Amendment
status is suggested by Professor Margaret Radin's "personhood
perspective" of property. 5 Professor Radin has suggested that
property interests take on special significance when they are
"closely bound up with personhood." Following a largely
pragmatic approach, Radin has argued that there is a "tacit
legal and cultural understanding" of two kinds of property: that
353. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
354. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (emphasizing the importance of
protecting "the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home").
355. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982) [hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood].
356. Id at 959.
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for which there is a personal attachment and that which is
more fungible in nature. 5 ' Personal property is that which is
closely related to one's person, where the person's identity is
bound up with the object. Conversely, fungible property is that
held "for purely instrumental reasons."3  Radin argues that
people should be accorded broad liberty with respect to
personhood property, since such property plays a special role in
self-development, and people are especially violated by its
loss. 9
Under this theory, the home is one of the clearest examples
of property reflecting personhood.c ° Not only is it the agreed
upon societal locale for privacy and autonomy, but most people
clearly identify with their home in some personal way. To give
significant weight to the home in First Amendment analysis is
to facilitate personhood itself.
Other than the right to exclude and property interests relat-
ed to the home, private property interests have played a less
obvious, though not necessarily insignificant role in First
357. RADIN, supra note 336, at 2.
358. Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 355, at 959-60. Radin builds her
"personhood" theory initially on an "intuitive view" of how people relate to different
types of property, discussing examples of how people become bound up with certain
types of property, such as a wedding ring, while other forms of property one might
own are easily replaceable with other goods. See id. at 959-61. She later reinforces
and refines this intuitive basis by resort to the writings of several philosophers, most
notably Hegel. See id. at 971-78. Her analysis of Hegel is complex, but notes the
ways in which Hegel saw "object-relations" as essential to the "full development of
the individual." See id. at 972-75. In the final analysis, her work primarily concerns
"a cultural description/critique of American institutions of property" and how our
particular "culture of property" is best understood, rather than adopting Hegel's or
Kant's views of property. See RADIN, supra note 336, at 9.
Radin's "personhood theory" of property has been quite influential in academic
circles. For a sympathetic critique of her theory, which briefly discusses the scope of
its influence, see Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of
Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1992-93).
359. See Radin Property and Personhood, supra note 355, at 1014-15.
360. Radin presents the home as a prime example of property for which there is
significant personal attachment. She notes that
there is . .. the feeling that it would be an insult for the state to in-
vade one's home because it is the scene of one's history and future, one's
life and growth. In other words, one embodies or constitutes oneself
there. The home is affirmatively part of oneself-property for
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Amendment analysis. At times, protecting private property has
been an important factor in limiting speech, such as in Renton.
In most instances, however, property interests are simply a
factor in the Court's balancing and typically do not come to the
forefront of analysis. This is consistent not only with First
Amendment jurisprudence, but also with traditional notions of
property rights. Courts have long defined property rights, in
particular those involving the use and enjoyment of property, in
less than absolute terms, recognizing that landowners must
tolerate reasonable interferences with the use and enjoyment of
land.36' The Court's First Amendment caselaw implicitly rec-
ognizes this inherent limitation of property by recognizing that
property rights are necessarily limited by other social concerns,
including expression.
Similarly, the Court's lack of deference to the property inter-
ests of regulated landowners when placing zoning restrictions
on First Amendment activities is sensible. Unlike Ladue, where
the property in question served a unique function for speech
because of personhood and autonomy concerns, zoning restric-
tions typically just allocate where First Amendment exercise
will take place. In this respect, the property owner holds at
most a fungible interest in the land, since other locations can
be substituted. Assuming that the zoning scheme provides for
adequate alternative sites, the restriction can be viewed as a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.
Thus, at least with respect to private property, the Court's
increased attention to property interests seems for the most
part a sensible and reasonably balanced approach to the inter-
ests involved. Property interests do not automatically determine
the outcome of First Amendment issues, but instead are evalu-
ated for their particular function and how they might relate to
or affect speech. Where they reflect core interests, they have
been given substantial weight. In other instances, they have
been given less significance. Although the Court's treatment
might be subject to some criticism, such as with regard to ac-
cess to quasi-public property,62 it generally reflects sensitivity
361. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 822(b) (1979).
362. See supra Part HA.
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to important functions of private property without giving undue
deference to property interests.
The Court's attention to property values is more disturbing
with regard to the public forum, however, where in recent years
the Court has arguably made the state's property rights the
dominant analytical vehicle. Although the Court's analysis falls
short of treating state property the same as private, the Court's
current tripartite test largely permits the state to determine the
use of property simply based on its status as owner. Any reso-
lution of public forum questions must, of course, recognize and
protect against unreasonable interference with the state's prop-
erty. However, as noted in Part One, public property is argu-
ably different than private property in several important re-
spects, and does not necessitate the same treatment. In particu-
lar, expectations of exclusive control and autonomy concerns,
important considerations in regulating access to private proper-
ty, are certainly less significant with regard to public property.
What is most troublesome about a "property rights" approach
to the public forum issue is its distributive impact on speech
opportunities. Access to public forum property has long been a
means by which the less advantaged can have some minimal
opportunity for expression. By treating all but the most clearly
traditional property as the state's property to control as it
pleases, the Court significantly limits speech opportunities,
especially as new and distinct types of public fora emerge in
society.
A better alternative to the current focus on the state's prop-
erty rights is the compatibility standard championed by a sig-
nificant minority of the Court. Instead of letting the
government's decision whether to dedicate property to speech be
the controlling factor, this approach would consider the actual
characteristics of the property in question and whether "expres-
sive activity would be appropriate and compatible" with the
property's purposes."c3 This would protect the state against
363. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joined in part by Justices Blackmun, Stevens
and Souter) ("If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the
actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate
that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the
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unreasonable interferences with its property while still permit-
ting speech in appropriate circumstances. The compatibility
standard is also more consistent with an approach that assesses
the particular function of asserted property interests, an ap-
proach the Court has demonstrated in instances where private
property interests affect First Amendment exercise.
property is a public forum.").
1997]

